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INTRODUCMON
In late 1998, the United States Congress enacted its most sweeping
revisions ever to the Copyright Act of 1976.1 Under the title Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,2 this amendment institutes radical
I See David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'yU.S. 401, 402 (1999) (describing the October 28, 1998 amendment as the most
significant of the 32 amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976).
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, § 1 (short title).
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changes, from protecting boat hulls with sui generisefrghts, to permit-
ting maintenance of computer systems without the consent of copy-
right owners whose software may, by chance, be copied in the proc-
ess,4 to mandating respect for copyright management information.
5
The most important feature of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act institutes anti-circumvention provisions into U.S. copyright law.
The details of the resulting section 1201, added to the Copyright Act,
are fiendishly complicated. Even without canvassing all of the nu-
ances, however, a philosophical issue emerges-how does this
amendment affect one of the cynosures of copyright law, its fair use
doctrine? A full answer would require complete explication of both
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and of the fair use doctrine of
6U.S. copyright law. Even without such an ambitious program, some
tentative steps into the terrain reveal interesting conclusions about the
thrust of this massive amendment.
I. THE RIF
As we confront questions in the waning days of the millennium
regarding the public policy of access and copying, it is instructive to
examine how these issues were treated at the beginning of the millen-
nium.7 Rabbi Isaac Al-fasi, known as the Rif,8 lived in North Africa in
the eleventh century.9 At around the same time that William, Duke of
3 See infra Part III.B.2 (describing how the Act confers protection on the design of
vessel hulls).
4 See 2 MELVn.LE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.08[D] (release 50 1999) (permitting the copying of software for the sole purpose of
maintenance and repair as long as the copy is used for no independent purpose and is
destroyed immediately thereafter) [hereinafterNIMMER].
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. IV 1998) ("Integrity of copyright management in-
formation"). This issue, in addition to the anti-circumvention features discussed in
thispaper, is addressed in 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, ch. 12A.
7 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.02 (examining the impact of the Act).
For an attempt to go even further back, see David Nimmer, Adams and Bits: Of
Jewish Kings and Copyrights, 71 S. CAL L. REV. 219 (1998), which examines copyright
issues through an analysis of Biblical and Talmudic texts.
8 Perhaps a more exact English transliteration would be as follows: Ri"f. The
three letters represent the initials for Rabbi Issac al Fasi (given that "al" is Arabic for
"the," it drops out of the equation). The quotation mark in the middle signals to the
Hebrew reader that the intent is to convey rashei-teivot [an acronym] rather than a real
word. In English, such words as "NATO" are printed in capital letters (which Hebrew
lacks) to make the same point.
9 Born in Algeria, his surname derived from his transplanted homeland in Fez,
Morocco [A-fasi = The Fezzite]. See2 ENCYCLOPEDIAJUDAICA 600, 601 (1973) (provid-
ing a biography and explaining the derivation of his name). In 1088, he was forced to
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Normandy, made headlines with his daring cross channel exploits,'0
the Rif occupied himself with a protocopyright question:"
Q. A student took books of sacred commentaries from a colleague.
When asked to return them, he took a strict vow not to return them until
such time as he could copy them. One rabbi permits this type of taking.
A. Both that rabbi and the student who took the books erred and did
not act according to law. The rabbi who permitted the taking reasoned
that this type of behavior is permitted, for it seemed to him that the stu-
dent wanted to learn matters of Torah from the books, which qualifies as
a mitzva [commanded, meritorious deed]. But he erred, for it is also
written that "[a] stolen lulav [palm frond] is pasul [ritually unfit] ." 2j
The Omnipresent detests a mitzva that emanates from sin, as it is written,
"God loves righteousness, and hates thievery in its iniquity."
To unpack the reasoning of the responsum," the Rif calls attention
to the fact that one who wants to wave a lulav on the holiday of Sukkot
is also behaving meritoriously to fulfill a mitzva. 4 That fact, however,
does not give him the right to steal. Indeed, if he does steal someone
else's lulav and proceeds to wave it, the stolen character of the lulav
nullifies the mitzva. Precisely such nullification is the meaning, within
the Jewish legal system, of something being pasul In like measure, the
meritorious intent of studying Torah cannot justify stealing someone
else's book containing words of Torah because the very act of theft
nullifies the otherwise meritorious character of the studying.1
In this responsum, we see two points of view expressed. The Rif
himself accords primacy to property ownership-he rules that the
owner of the book enjoys untrammeled rights in it and is unimpressed
with contrary arguments founded on public policy.1 6 On the other
hand, he acknowledges that his is not the only view. By expressing
flee to Spain, at age 75. See id. (explaining that he was denounced by enemies).
10 See, e.g., The Bayeux Tapestry, available at <http://batte1066.com/baypart2.
html/> (depicting the Norman conquest).
n She'ailot uteshuvot haRif, number 133 (Hadar Linotyping & Pub. Co., 1954). All
English translations are mine. I thank Rabbi Eliezer Kwass ofYeshivat Darch6 Noam in
Beit Hakerem,Jerusalem, for introducing me to these materials.
"2 The full text of the section of the mishnah quoted within this passage states that
"[a] stolen or dried up lulav is pasuL" Mishnah Succah 3:1. For the Hebrew text and an
additional English translation, see ART SCROLL MISHNAH SERIES, 3 MOED at Succah 3:1
(Nosson Scherman & Meir Zlotowitz eds., 1997).
"3 A responsum is a formal answer to a religious question.
14 See Leviticus 23:40 (describing the commandment of assembling the lulav).
"s See She'ailot uteshuvot haRiyf supra note 11.
16 As we shall see, this point of view matches that of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee when initially deliberating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See infra text ac-
companying note 63 (recognizing the property rights of a copyright owner).
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himself in opposition to an anonymous rabbi who ruled to the con-
trary, the Rif reveals that other currents swirl through these waters. 7
It bears emphasis that the nameless rabbi with whom the Rif disagrees
rules, as a legal matter, that the interests in accessing the contents
contained in another's goods trump the property interests therein.
The great Sephardic rabbis of nine centuries ago were concededly
vastly ahead of their contemporaries in Ashkenaz18 But wisdom even-
tually migrated from Moslem Spain to Christian Germany. In addi-
tion, a technological revolution of inestimable importance to copy-
right transpired in the latter locale in the fifteenth century-the
invention of the printing press.19 We therefore find similar copyright
concerns radiating out to Poland in the sixteenth century.
To appreciate the context here, we must begin with an extract
from the classic compendium ofJewish law, still in use to this day: the
Shulchan Aruch [Set Table] written by the great Sephardic commenta-
tor, Rabbi Joseph Karo.°
One who safeguards another's Sefer Torah [parchment scroll containing
the Five Books of Moses] must roll it once every twelve months [to help
preserve it 21]. If, while rolling it, the bailee reads from it, that is permit-
17 As noted below, a welter of interests had to be satisfied before the Digital Mil-
lennium CopyrightAct could be enacted. See infra Part l.A (discussing the necessity to
balance and navigate competing interests).
is Writing in thirteenth-century Provence, Shem Tov ben Joseph Falaquera com-
mented, "Nowadays, it is sufficient for a man to read the halakhot [rulings] of Rabbi
Alfasi of blessed memory, and along with them the books of our Rabbi Moses [Mai-
monides] of blessed memory .... " MOSHE HALBERTAL, PEOPLE OF THE BOOK
CANON, MEANING AND AUTHoRrlY 106 (1997). (I take this opportunity to express my
thanks to Moshe Halbertal for the opportunity to study with him at the Hartman Insti-
tute in Jerusalem.) Note that both rabbis Alfasi and Maimonides come from the
Sephardic tradition, centered in Spain, as opposed to the later "Ashkenazim," whose
tradition originated in Germany.
19 See ELIZABETH L. FISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE 3-4
(1979) (commenting on the far-reaching effects of the invention of the printing
press). That invention relates directly to the codifications of Jewish law discussed
above. See HALBERTAL, supra note 18 (explaining that Ashkenazim began to codify
texts to protect against printing errors). Note that the printing genie was too potent to
be coaxed back into the bottle, although many and varied camps would have wished it
so. See i& at 118 ("Opposition to printing the Zohar [a mystical text] came from two
different camps [in sixteenth-century Italy]: one considered the Zohar to be a hereti-
cal text... ; the other perceived it as a sacred text which ought to be accessible only to
the elite.").
20 It should be noted that R. Karo's respect for the Rif bordered on reverence. See
2 ENCYCLOPEDIAJUDAIcA 600, 603 (1973) (explaining that Karo determined the laws
of the Shuichan Aruch on the Rif's authority).
21 The reason for the rolling is not made clear in the text itself. A commentator
explains that rolling the parchment prevents it from deteriorating. See SHULCHAN
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ted; but he must not open it for the express purpose of reading for his
own benefit, as opposed to rolling it for the bailor's benefit. The same
applies to other books. If the bailee opens and reads them for his own
sake, he has invaded the domain of the bailment, and is liable.5
The standard commentary on the Shulchan Aruch used by Ash-
kenazim is the Mapa [Tablecloth] which was composed by Rabbi
Moses Isserlis,5 known by the acronym Rema.24 In this context, the
Rema adds the following:
In the same way as it is forbidden to read from it, it is forbidden to copy
a single letter from it. This ruling applies to the uneducated. But as to a
sage, assuming he lacks that volume, he is permitted to read it and to
copy from it. For such undoubtedly was the intent 15 of the bailor. 1261
But in a place where Torah is lacking because books are unavailable, the
tribunal can force someone to lend his books so that they can be stud-
ied, so long as he is recom ensed for any wear and tear to the book that
might occur in the process.
Here, we see a tremendous innovation. The lawmaking body,8
according to the Rema, can intervene to remedy the lack of availability
of a class of works.2 As a systemic matter, the law can value the right
ARUCH, CHOSHEN MISHPAT, HILCEOT PIKADON 292:20, at Be'er Heitev commentary.
SHULCHANARUCH, supra note 21, at 292:20.
The innovation of the printing press caused an "overabundance of opinions and
their too facile dissemination." HALBERTAL, supra note 18, at 76. The codes of both R.
Karo and R. Isserlis arose as a response. See id. at 76, 164 n.57. In particular, R. Isserlis
departed "from the Ashkenazic tradition of not creating fixed codes" in response to
the duplication of error that printing fostered. Id. at 164 n.57. As he wrote in Cracow
in 1569, "Time perishes, and their words do not perish ... and afterward these books
themselves are printed and the one who reads them claims that they are all given in
Sinai and rules according to them mistakenly, since those books are meant to be short
and clear, and they distorted them." Id.
24 Technically, the acronym should be written: Rem"a or Ram"a. As the latter
formulation carries Hindu overtones to Anglophonic ears, this Article chooses the
former.
For a parallel construction of the doctrine of implied licenses, see David Nim-
mer, Brains and OtherParaphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (1996)
(examining implicit licenses in copyright law).
26 The logic here is that those in the stream of tradition who would prize owning a
holy book in the first place must surely approve its dissemination to those imbued with
the desire to study Torah.
27 SHULCHANARucH, supra note 22, at Rema commentary.
28 Following the demise of the Sanhedrin [Rabbinic Parliament] in the fifth cen-
tury, legislative as well as judicial power was vested in the Beit Din [court] as the
authoritative body. Note that there are two interacting senses of the word "authority,"
and that they relate to the cognate of"author." SeeHALBERTAL, supra note 18, at 84-85.
The parallel to the approach of the House Commerce Committee, ultimately
adopted into law as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, could not be more
pronounced. See infra Part III.C.2.b (utilizing fair use principles to protect public ac-
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of public access" to unavailable works more heavily than the property
rights of the owners of those works. To phrase the matter in a mod-
em idiom, when assertion of property rights would make a given class
of works unavailable to the public who wishes to peruse them, then
legislative redress is required."'
Both the Rif and Rema were writing long before any country had
enacted a copyright statute.32 It is hardly surprising to reflect that nei-
ther was attempting to vindicate copyright interests, in the sense of
protecting the rights of authors.ts Instead, their concern is with the
property owner of the book in which the author's words had been
embodied. Their writings reflect the tension between members of the
public who have an interest in copying works and the owner of the
tangible item sought to be copied. That tension arose because the
legal system at the time of the Rif and the Rema attempted to recon-
cile disparate goals. All the players--the Rif, the rabbi with whom he
disagrees, R Karo, and the Rema-acknowledge the value of property
ownership. They also recognize, as a fundamental good within their
legal system, the inherent value of access to Torah and of the dissemi-
nation of the insights of Torah. To the extent that the players might
reach disparate practical results, the difference stems from the con-
trasting ways in which each attempts to reconcile those competing in-
terests.
The Rif stands for absolute property interests. Without disagree-
cess).
30 Does it overstate matters to call this right "public" access? Should it be called
"elite access," as the ruling is only for the benefit of the sage, rather than the public?
The two categories that the Rema invokes are am ha-arez [uneducated public] and tal-
mid chaam [wise student, sage]. The former comprises a group who, given its lack of
knowledge, would derive no benefit from access to works that its members would not
be capable of reading. Thus, those members of "the public" who can benefit from this
right fall within its penumbra, and the term "public access" is therefore appropriate.
31 See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing § 1201's provision for rulemaking which leads
to the publication of any class of copyrighted works for which noninfringing uses by
adversely affected individuals are to be safeguarded).
32 See HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 3-15 (1956) (detailing the
establishmentof the first copyright statute in 1710).
35 The Rif juxtaposes thievery against robbery (gezel and geneivah). While it is
tempting to translate his words as condemning both the wrong to the book owner via
taking and the separate wrong to the copyright owner via copying, the language is too
obscure-at least to this reader of his words-to have any confidence that such was his
intent.
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ing that there is independent value in access to Torah, he derides any
notion that property rights can be sacrificed in the process. The Rif's
opponent considers rights of public access as sometimes more funda-
mental than property ownership. Finally, there is the innovation
championed by the Rema-of crafting new legal rules such that access
trumps property.
Similar goals animated discussions in Congress of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act. All of the congressional players acknowl-
edged the value of copyright as a species of intellectual property. All
equally admitted that copyright's constitutional purpose is to promote
the progress of "science,"34 i.e., of disseminating knowledge. To the
extent that contending forces championed different points of view,
their differences stemmed from the way in which each sought to rec-
oncile one social good against another.
As we will see below, the Rif's views were played out in the House
Judiciary Committee when the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was
first introduced. By the time that deliberations on the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act had concluded, however, the viewpoint of the
Rif's opponent had won universal support. Additionally, the House
Commerce Committee adopted the Rema's suggested innovation
early on. This point of view ultimately carried the day when the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act was enacted into law. The question re-
mains to be explored below how successfully that committee drafted
the statutory language to meet its stated concern.*3
It is time, therefore, to move forward from the Rif and the Rema,
in order to engage in an extended exploration of U.S. copyright doc-
trine as it has taken shape in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
We will recur to them in evaluating the handiwork of their intellectual
heirs.
II. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
The millennial hope underlying the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act is to bring U.S. copyright law "squarely into the digital age."36 As
34 That noun is used presciently and conscientiously in its eighteenth century sense,
as opposed to today's usage in contrast to the humanities. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 1.03 n.1 (noting that "in colonial usage 'science' referred to the works of authors").
35 See infra Part III.B (evaluating Congress's attempts to safeguard fair use in
§ 1201).
36 REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2
(1998) [hereinafterS. REP. (DMCA)].
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part of the ceaseless struggle to keep up with constantly evolving tech-
nology,37 this law proposes to "make digital networks safe places to dis-
seminate and exploit copyrighted materials."38 By creating "the legal
platform for launching the global digital on-line marketplace[9 1 for
copyrighted works," its goal is to "make available via the Internet the
movies, music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of Ameri-
can[40 1 creative genius.
'
4
The primary battleground in which the omnibus Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act achieved this goal is its first title, the WIPO Copy-
right and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation
Act of 1998 (the '"IPO Treaties Act").42 This law brought U.S. copy-
right law into compliance with two treaties drafted at a Diplomatic
Conference held in December of 1996.4 The features discussed
herein all appear in that first title of the new law. Foremost among
them is the new section 1201 that the WIPO Treaties Act added to the
Copyright Act of 1976.44
A. Background-Regulation of Devices and Services
One of the most salient features of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act is that it serves several masters. In order to understand the
thrust of the law, it is essential to appreciate Congress's concern with
37 See id. at 2 ("Copyright laws have struggled through the years to keep pace with
emerging technology from the struggle over music played on a player piano roll in the
1900's to the introduction of the VCR in the 1980's." (citations omitted)).
3 Id.
39 The law is designed not only to serve the goals of the online community. "It will
also encourage the continued growth of the existing off-line global marketplace for
copyrighted works in digital format by setting strong international copyright stan-
dards." Id. at 8.
40 The portentously captioned "Digital Millennium Copyright Act," and its fixation
on safeguarding "American creative genius," reflects the distinctive zeitgeist of "a people
crazed with an appetite for information, w[ho] are natural Gnostics anyway." HAROLD
BLOOM, OMENS OF MILLENNIUM: THE GNOSIS OF ANGELS, DREAMS, AND
RESURRECTION 226 (1996).
41 S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 2.
42 Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 101, 112 Stat. 2860, 2861 (1998) (short title).
43 For this observer's perspective as a participant at that Conference, see the WIPO
Treaty Triptych: David Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties, 22 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1
(1997); David Nimmer, Aus derNeuen Welt, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1998) (dis-
cussing copyright management information, "one of the web of copyright issues that
[the world wide web] poses," and the innovation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty); and
David Nimmer, Time and Space, 38 IDEA 501 (1998) (discussing various aspects of, and
events taking place at, the 1996 Diplomatic Conference).
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
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balancing the interests of copyright proprietors, on the one hand,
against the interests of the community of users, scholars, equipment
manufacturers, and on-line service providers, on the other.4
During its deliberations through sequential referral to diverse
congressional committees,4 the bill for the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act progressed from one designed solely to protect copyright in-
terests into a more broad-based redress of various aspects relating to
digital commerce. 7 The introductory commentary from the House
Commerce Committee discusses this phenomenon at length.
H.R. 2281 is one of the most important pieces of legislation affecting
electronic commerce that the 105th Congress will consider. It estab-
lishes a wide range of rules that will govern not only copyright owners in
the marketplace for electronic commerce, but also consumers, manufac-
turers, distributors, libraries, educators, and on-line service providers.
H.R. 2281, in other words, is about much more than intellectual prop-
erty. It defines whether consumers and businesses may engage in certain
conduct, or use certain devices, in the course of transacting electronic
commerce. Indeed, many of these rules may determine the extent to
which electronic commerce realizes its potential.
The Committee on Commerce's role in considering this legislation is
therefore critical. The Committee has a long-standing interest in ad-
dressing all issues relating to interstate and foreign commerce, including
commerce transacted over all electronic mediums, such as the Internet,
and regulation of interstate and foreign communications. This legisla-
tion implicates each of those interests in numerous ways.
45 See infra Part III.A (discussing § 1201's various protections for fair use and its
anti-circumvention bans).
46 Even when reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, the bill was pre-
sented as a product of broadly supported compromises. See REPORT OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON COMMERcE, H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 22 (1998) [hereinafter
COMMERE REP. (DMCA)] (stating that the bill previously reported out by the Judici-
ary Committee was a "compromis[e]" that enjoyed "broad support"). Nonetheless,
further hearings revealed that the bill "faced significant opposition from many private
and public sector interests, including libraries, institutions of higher learning, con-
sumer electronics and computer product manufacturers, and others with a vital stake
in the growth of electronic commerce and the Internet." Id.
47 The House Commerce Committee concluded that its revision to the bill previ-
ously reported on by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees "has appropriately
balanced the interests of content owners, on-line and other service providers, and in-
formation users in a way that will foster the continued development of electronic
commerce and the growth of the Internet." Id. at 21.
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
UNDERSTANDING THE NEXUS BETWEEN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The debate on this legislation highlighted two important priorities:
promoting the continued growth and development of electronic com-
merce; and protecting intellectual property rights. These goals are mu-
tually supportive. A thriving electronic marketplace provides new and
powerful ways for the creators of intellectual property to make their
works available to legitimate consumers in the digital environment. And
a plentiful supply of intellectual property-whether in the form of soft-
ware, music, movies, literature, or other works-drives the demand for a
48more flexible and efficient electronic marketplace.
How can that balance be achieved? Historically, Congress has
achieved the objectives of the Constitution's Copyright Clause "by
regulating the use of information-not the devices or means by which
the information is delivered or used by information consumers-and
by ensuring an appropriate balance between the interests of copyright
owners and information users."49 The various provisions of the Copy-
right Act, on the one hand creating rights for proprietors but on the
other hand delineating the scope of those rights,5 have as a unifying
theme the fact that they are all "technology neutral."51 That is to say,
those laws
do not regulate commerce in information technology, i.e., products and
devices for transmitting, storing, and using information. Instead, they
prohibit certain actions and create exceptions to permit certain conduct
deemed to be in the greater public interest, all in a way that balances the
interests of copyright owners and users of copyrighted works.5
2
New threats, however, sometimes necessitate new approaches.
The Commerce Committee therefore concluded its examination by
recognizing that
the digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright
owners, and as such, necessitates protection against devices that under-
mine copyright interests. In contrast to the analog experience, digital
technology enables pirates to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of
48 I& at 22-23.
49 Id. at 24.
50 See generally 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 8.01-8.24 (discussing the rights protected
by copyright and their limitations).
COMMER E REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 24.
52 Id- at 24.
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works-at virtually no cost at all to the pirate. As technology advances,
so must our laws.I
s
The committee, therefore, incorporated anti-circumvention stric-
tures into the WIPO Treaties Act.5 Those strictures target not only
bad acts (the activity of copying itself),55 but also bad machines (de-
vices that facilitate copying) and bad services (conduct that enables
56copying) . In this manner, copyright law expands its reach.
B. Section 1201 's Anti-Circumvention Bans
Section 1201 separately defines three separate species of anti-
circumvention violations-a basic provision, a ban on trafficking, and
"additional violations." The core is the "basic provision" that provides:
"No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title. 5 7 The statute
conditions this provision in numerous particulars, which form the
bulk of the fair use discussion below.
58
The "ban on trafficking" provides as follows:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component,
or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumvent-
ing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls ac-
cess to a work protected under this title; or
53 Id. at 25.
The irony is that the Commerce Committee desired to ensure that the Copyright
Act (which occupies title 17 of the United States Code) itself would remain technology
neutral and therefore "removed the anti-circumvention provisions from Title 17 and
established them as free-standing provisions of law." Id. As enacted, however, those
provisions found their way back into title 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998)
("Circumvention of copyright protection systems").
55 The basic provision of § 1201 targets in part such conduct. See infra Part II.B
(discussing the basic anti-circumvention provision).
The ban on trafficking and additional provisions of § 1201 are directed against
such devices, as well as components of devices, services, and other targets. See infra
Part II.B (discussing these provisions).
57 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (A).
M See infra Part III.C (examining the policy rationale for the fair use aspects of
§ 1201).
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(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title.59
The "additional violations" are almost identically worded:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component,
or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumvent-
ing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively pro-
tects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work
or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.0
Given that the statutory terminology used for the foregoing two
provisions differs only subtly--and given that the face of the statute
itself reveals no clue as to which variant is aimed against what type of
infraction-one must revert to the legislative history to gain an idea of
Congress's intent in adopting the language of the statute.
61
1. Breaking and Entering
The basic provision and the ban on trafficking appear together in
59 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2).
17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
61 The treaty language which these provisions aim to implement is not much more
pellucid:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this
Treaty or the Beme Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their
works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by
law.
Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties, supra note 43, at 17-18 (quoting WIPO Copyright
Treaty, art. 11).
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the same paragraph of the statute.62 The committee report comments
that those two bans pertain "when a person has not obtained author-
ized access to a copy or a phonorecord of a work for which the copy-
right owner has put in place a technological measure that effectively
controls access to his or her work."' In a more colloquial form: "The
act of circumventing a technological protection measure put in place
by a copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work is the
electronic equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to ob-
tain a copy of a book."6
The basic provision, under this typology, is equivalent to breaking
into a castle-the invasion inside another's property is itself the of-
fense. 5 Note that the gravamen here is not copyright infringement.6
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
63 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998) [hereinafter H. REP. (DMCA)].
64 Id. at 17.
[The WIPO Treaties Act] encourages technological solutions, in general, by
enforcing private parties' use of technological protection measures with legal
sanctions for circumvention and for producing and distributing products or
providing services that are aimed at circumventing technological protection
measures that effectively protect copyrighted works. For example, if unau-
thorized access to a copyrighted work is effectively prevented through use of a
password, it would be a violation of this section to defeat or bypass the pass-
word and to make the means to do so, as long as the primary purpose of the
means was to perform this kind of act. This is roughly analogous to making it
illegal to break into a house using a tool, the primary purpose of which is to
break into houses.
S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 11 (footnote omitted).
"Paragraph (a) (1) establishes a general prohibition against gaining unauthor-
ized access to a work by circumventing a technological protection measure put in place
by the copyright owner where such protection measure otherwise effectively controls
access to a work protected under Title 17 of the U.S. Code." H. REP. (DMCA), supra
note 63, at 17-18.
As Congress itself recognized, "these... provisions have little, if anything, to do
with copyright law." COMMERCE RE'. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 24. Instead, as 62
copyright law professors stated in a letter to Congress, they "represent an unprece-
dented departure into the zone of what might be called "paracopyright." Id. at 24-25.
Although quoting the professors' terminology, Congress rejected the substance of
their recommendation. See id. at 25. As to the enterprise of professors weighing in to
Congress en masse about issues of legal concern, this review's pages have recently venti-
lated the wisdom of that device. CompareNeil Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton
Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 167 (1999) (not-
ing that copyright reform is among many issues in which academics have written joint
letters to Congress in recent years, and arguing that such a process undermines their
credibility), with Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 200
n.31 (1999) (disagreeing with Devins but explaining how his dog became newsworthy).
Turning to the substance of the professors' claim regarding "an unprecedented
departure," those professors are undoubtedly correct in asserting that this zone repre-
sents a departure from traditional copyright interest. See Nimmer, Aus der Neuen Welt,
DIGITAL MILLFNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
What of the trafficking ban? It targets not those who break into
another's domain, but instead those who facilitate the process--say,
those who market siege engines or catapults, devise ingenious infiltra-
don strategies, and generally facilitate penetration of the stronghold.67
This supplementary prohibition provides "meaningful protection and
enforcement of the copyright owner's right to control access to his or
her copyrighted work."6 Building on previous doctrines of law out-
side the copyright arena (such as those barring manufacture of
equipment to receive unauthorized cable television service69 and de-
crypting cable programming),7 the trafficking ban is "drafted care-
fully to target 'black boxes,' and to ensure that legitimate multipur-
pose devices can continue to be made and sold."7' By its limited
application to works that are designed for infringement or have only
.limited commercial significance other than to infringe, the ban on
trafficking "is designed to protect copyright owners, and simultane-
ously allow the development of technology."7n Thus, it is "not aimed at
supra note 43, at 204 ("[This feature] more closely resembles historic protection under
the telecommunications law, or even more pointedly, the Jesse James Act' forbidding
armed postal robbery, than it does the balance of Title 17." (footnote omitted)). As to
its being unprecedented, however, consideration of similarly extraneous amendments
to the Copyright Act in 1984, 1992, and 1994 "show[s] that this departure is actually
only too precedented." 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.17[B] n.14 (referencing Semi-
conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, and Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act).
67 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 18; COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46,
at 38.
69 The House Committee on Commerce and the Judiciary as well as the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary all identified the need to couple prohibitions on circum-
venting copyright protection with prohibitions on the development of technologies
intended to circumvent copyright protection. SeeCOMMERCEREP. (DMCA), supra note
46, at 38 n.2 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2) (1994)); H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at
18 (same); S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 86, at 11, 28 (same).
70 See H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 18 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (1994)).
Closer to home, it resembles the Copyright Act's ban on digital audio tapes that fail to
respect the serial copy management system (or equivalent techniques). Id (citing 17
U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994)). See 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 8B.03[B] (providing an over-
view of serial copy management technology).
71 H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 18; S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 29.
The other House committee charged with evaluating the bill expressed itself, if any-
thing, even more forcefully: "The Committee believes it is very important to empha-
size that Section [1201) (a) (2) is aimed fundamentally at outlawing so-called 'black
boxes' that are expressly intended to facilitate circumvention of technological protec-
tion measures for purposes of gaining access to a work." COMMERCE REP. (DMCA),
supra note 46, at 38. It reiterates the same language as to the additional violations. Ia
at 39 (restating the Committee's interest in outlawing "black boxes").
COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 39; H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63,
at 18; S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 29.
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products that are capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses, such as consumer electronics, telecommunications, and com-
puter products-including videocassette recorders, 7 telecommunica-
tions switches, personal computers, and servers-used by businesses
and consumers for perfectly legitimate74 purposes."m  Although such
normal household devices lie outside the statute's purview, a manu-
facturer cannot escape liability by "labeling... as a common house-
76hold device" something primarily designed to infringe.
2. Disorderly Conduct
In contrast to invading the sanctity of another's castle (the basic
provision), if a guest invited inside the manor contravenes the sei-
gneur's edicts, then the trespass at hand differs qualitatively from
breaking and entering. Thus, the basic provision is inapplicable to
"the subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained
authorized access to a copy of a work protected under Title 17, even if
such actions involve circumvention of additional forms of technologi-
cal protection measures."78 Instead, the statute's "additional viola-
tions" come into play here. They ban "circumventing protection af-
forded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner,"79 a formulation parallel to the ban on trafficking,"
albeit subject to slightly different definitions."' Like that earlier ban,
73 A later amendment to the bill aims, however, in sweeping fashion, at videocas-
sette recorders. See 8 NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 12A.06 (discussing the Act's
"[r]egulation of [c]onsumer [a]nalog [d]evices").
74 See H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 10 (identifying legitimate purposes as in-
cluding "obvious and numerous commercially significant purposes and uses other than
circumventing such protections").
75 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 38. As before, the committee reiter-
ates the same language as to the additional violations. See id at 39-40 (noting that the
language also applies to the additional violations provision).
H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 10.
7 See id. at 19 (noting that subsection (b) applies when a person has obtained
authorization to use a copy or a phonorecord, but limitations have been placed on fur-
ther use of the copyrighted work).
78 H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 18; see also S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at
28.
79 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1) (C) (Supp. 1V 1998).
80 H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 19 (describing ban on trafficking). The re-
port notes that, like the ban on trafficking, the additional provisions are also "designed
to protect copyright owners, and simultaneously allow the development of technol-
ogy." Id.
81 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (3) (defining the phrases "circumvent a technologi-
cal measure" and "effectively controls access to a work"), with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2)
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however, this one too "is designed to protect copyright owners, and
simultaneously allow the development of technology."
8 2
3. Distinctions Between Those Schemes
Care must be taken to distinguish the ban on trafficking from the
similarly worded additional violations. 5 According to the legislative
history, "[t ]he two sections are not interchangeable, and many devices
will be subject to challenge only under one of the subsections. " 4 As
an example, however, the report offers not a concrete posture, but an
obtusely worded restatement of the statute's effect.8
The additional violations appear in their own statutory para-
graph, separate from the preceding paragraph of section 1201 that
contains both the basic provision and the ban on trafficking.87 The
paragraph setting forth the additional violations contains nothing
comparable to the basic provision. Accordingly, there is a marked
contrast between the two schemes. As to prohibited access, the person
engaging in that conduct has violated the basic provision; anyone as-
sisting her through publicly offering services, products, devices, etc.,
to achieve the prohibited technological breach is separately culpable
under the ban on trafficking. By contrast, a person who engages in
prohibited usage of a work to which he has lawful access does not fall
afoul of any provision of section 1201. It is only someone who assists
him through publicly offering services, products, devices, etc., to
(defining "circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure" and "effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title").
82 COMM:ERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 40; H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63,
at 19; S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 30.
83 See S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 29 (noting that the trafficking and addi-
tional violations provisions should be considered separately).
84 Id. at 12.
85
[I]f an effective technological protection measure does nothing to prevent ac-
cess to the plain text of the work, but is designed to prevent that work from
being copied, then a potential cause of action against the manufacturer of a
device designed to circumvent the measure lies under subsection 1201 (b), but
not under subsection 1201(a) (2). Conversely, if an effective technological
protection measure limits access to the plain text of a work only to those with
authorized access, but provides no additional protection against copying, dis-
playing, performing or distributing the work, then a potential cause of action
against the manufacturer of a device designed to circumvent the measure lies
under subsection 1201 (a) (2), but not under subsection 1201 (b).
Id
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
87 These violations are both set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a).
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achieve the prohibited technological breach who becomes culpable
under the additional violations.8
The chart below helps to explain the taxonomy of section 1201.
Basic Provision
No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected by
[United States copyright].
Trafficking Ban
No person shall manufacture, im-
port, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or
part thereof, that is primarily designed
or produced for the purpose of cir-
cumventing a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under [United States copyright].
Additional Violations
No person shall manufacture, im-
port, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or
part thereof, that is primarily designed
or produced for the purpose of cir-
cumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under
[United States copyright] in a work or
a portion thereof.
Table 1-Taxonomy of Section 1201
88 The legislative history notes that, "where a copy control technology is employed
to prevent the unauthorized reproduction of a work, the circumvention of that tech-
nology would not itself be actionable under § 1201, but any reproduction of the work
that is thereby facilitated would remain subject to the protections embodied in ti-
de 17." S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 29. Accepting the claim that the later re-
productions themselves would be subject to attack as copyright infringement, why
would the threshold conduct "not itself be actionable under section 1201" as an addi-
tional violation? For that conduct circumvents "protection afforded by a technological
protection measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner," which was
part of the bill even as then formulated. See id. at 86. The claim seems in error.
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The upper half of this table represents the two features found in
the first paragraph of section 1201. The basic provision sets forth a
substantive offense, and the trafficking ban ensnares those who assist
in violating the basic provision. The bottom half of the table repre-
sents the second paragraph of section 1201. In this context, sec-
tion 1201 itself sets forth no basic ban; instead, that is the province of
traditional copyright law. (For that reason, the lower left quadrant of
the table remains blank.) However, the additional violations of sec-
tion 1201 hold liable those who aid that underlying conduct by help-
ing to circumvent technological measures.
Why is it that section 1201 is drafted, as the table illustrates, to set
forth both an underlying basic provision and a complementary traf-
ficking ban without any comparable underlying provision correspond-
ing to its additional violations? The legislative history explains the ra-
tionale at work here:
[T]he reason there is no prohibition on conduct [as part of the addi-
tional violations] akin to the prohibition on circumvention conduct in
[the basic provision is that the basic provision itself] is necessary because
prior to this Act, the conduct of circumvention was never before made
unlawful. The device limitation in [the ban on trafficking] enforces this
new prohibition on conduct. The copyright law has long forbidden
copyright infringements, so no new prohibition was necessary. The de-
vice limitation in [the additional violations] enforces the longstanding
prohibitions on infringements.8
9
Before concluding, a word of caution is in order about the castle
conceit invoked throughout this discussion. Copyright is a right less
absolute than the real property interests in one's domicile."0 Although
89 S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 12. Given the stark contrast in how the two
paragraphs are drafted, it would be improper for a court to construe § 1201 to bar the
unenumerated behavior of one who engages solely in prohibited usage of a work to
which he has lawful access. That is the function, instead, of traditional copyright law.
To the extent that that individual capitalizes on his success, however, by offering com-
parable services to the public, at that point he incurs liability under § 1201's additional
violations. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (prohibiting the circumvention of technological
protection).
90 One witness testifying to Congress about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
related an example he had used to demonstrate to laymen the natural law underpin-
nings of copyright protection. He pointed to land cleared by the listener's great-
grandfather, and invoked the moral equivalence of the heir's right to enjoy the fruits
of that labor. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liabil-
ity Limitation Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Comm. on theJudiday, 105th Cong. 168 (1997) (statement ofJohn Bettis, song-
writer on behalf of American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers) [herein-
after 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33]. The problem with that analogy is that it actually
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the statute does not permit individuals initially to circumvent techno-
logical protective measures in order to break into the castle, i.e., to
gain unauthorized access to the work," it nonetheless contains a "user
exemption" to the basic provision that countenances such circumven-
tion, even when initial access was unauthorized. 2 In addition, once
lawfully inside the castle, i.e., vis-a-vis a work that has been lawfully ac-
quired, that individual may circumvent the protection measures pur-
suant to lawful conduct, such as to make fair use of the subject work.
93
C. Statutory Exemptions in Section 1201
1. General Exemptions
The vast bulk of section 1201 comprises its numerous exemptions.
These apply for many specific purposes and are crafted with extreme
complexity.14 The discussion below gives content to some of these ex-
emptions by comparing and contrasting them to the exemption for
fair use, the primary focus of inquiry.95
2. User Exemption
In adopting the WIPO Treaties Act, Congress evinced great solici-
tude for the role played by judicious application of the fair use doc-
trine.9 That concern finds practical implementation in the instant
proves the opposite of the desired point. For copyrights, unlike real property, are
time-limited; an heir typically has no right to enjoy royalties from a copyright four gen-
erations old. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 9.08-9.12 (discussing the duration of copy-
right protection).
See H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 17-18 (discussing the prohibition against
circumventing technological protection measures employed by copyright owners).
92 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing § 1201's user exemption provisions). To extend
the metaphor, a constable armed with a warrant may invade a man's castle, even with-
out the owner's consent. Section 1201 affords a user armed with a legitimate purpose
under copyright law the same "police powers." Questions arise, however, as to how
well this statutory scheme works in practice. See infra Part III.C.4 (examining the prac-
tical impact of the Act).
0s See H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 18 (noting that an individual would be
able to circumvent "in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired
lawfully"). For an expanded discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.C.
94 For a full analysis, see NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.04, which discusses exemp-
tions from anti-circumvention violations.
95 See infra Parts II.D and II1.A (discussing the statutory exemptions for fair use un-
der § 1201).
96 The House Commerce Committee discussed this issue at length. See COMMERCE
REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 25-26, 37-38, 85-87 (discussing the role of fair use in
the digital environment).
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domain through a "fail-safe" mechanism.
97
a. Theory
To appreciate this mechanism, consider first how one can wax
rhetorical about the great gains afforded by wide-scale access to copy-
righted materials allowed by the Internet."
A plethora of information, most of it embodied in materials subject to
copyright protection, is available to individuals, often for free, that just a
few years ago could have been located and acquired only through the
expenditure of considerable time, resources, and money. New examples
of this greatly expanded availability of copyrighted materials occur every
day.
An undertow looms, however, when one reflects that the tide can
as easily fall as rise. Future marketplace realities could "dictate a dif-
ferent outcome, resulting in less access, rather than more, to copy-
righted materials that are important to education, scholarship, and
other socially vital endeavors." 9 Such waning of the public's access to
important works could stem from evanescence of hard copies in a
world of pan-electronic access, from embedding into those electronic
files encryption devices (that might remain active long after copyright
protection has ceased), from new business models that call for "re-
stricting distribution and availability, rather than upon maximizing it,"
or from factors not yet in evidence on the horizon. 0' Regardless of
their provenance, the possibility of those scenarios calls forth the need
to temper the categorical reach of the basic provision. As stated by
the legislative history, it is "appropriate to modify the flat prohibition
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that
control access to copyrighted materials, in order to ensure that access
97 See id. at 36 ("Given the threat of a diminution of otherwise lawful access to
works and information.., a 'fail-safe' mechanism is required."). Query whether, as
implemented, the mechanism truly qualifies for that billing. See infra Part III.C.4 (ex-
amining how well § 1201 actually protects fair use).
9s
The growth and development of the Internet has already had a significant
positive impact on the access of American students, researchers, consumers,
and the public at large to informational resources that help them in their ef-
forts to learn, acquire new skills, broaden their perspectives, entertain them-
selves, and become more active and informed citizens.
COMMERcE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 35.
99 Id. at 35-36.
Wo Id. at 36.
'01 Id.
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for lawful purposes is not unjustifiably diminished."
10 2
Toward that end, Congress devised an exemption for users. In
brief, this mechanism serves to "monitor developments in the market-
place for copyrighted materials, and allow the enforceability of the
prohibition against the act of circumvention to be selectively waived,
for limited time periods, if necessary to prevent a diminution in the
availability to individual users of a particular category of copyrighted
materials.""4 Implementation here depends on rulemaking under-
taken pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. 05
b. Application
Having enunciated the basic provision,0 6 section 1201 continues
to specify that the ban does "not apply to persons who are users of a
copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works." 7 The stat-
ute itself does not give direct content to its enigmatic reference to "a
particular class of works."0 8 But it does shed some light on that term
insofar as it limits the foregoing release from the basic provision to
the extent that "such persons are ... adversely affected by virtue of
such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of that
particular class of works under" U.S. copyright law. ',9 The legislative
history notes the obvious point that a "particular class of copyrighted
102 Id.
103 As reported by the Judiciary Committee, the basic provision would have been
absolute, with no solicitude for fair use. The Commerce Committee, however, re-
ported out an amended bill that "creates a rulemaking proceeding in which the issue
of whether enforcement of the regulation should be temporarily waived with regard to
particular categories of works can be fully considered and fairly decided on the basis of
real marketplace developments that may diminish otherwise lawful access to works."
Id The latter approach carried the day. See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing the circum-
stances in which § 1201 does not apply).
104 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 36.
105 See id at 37 (stating that the determination as to whether to temporarily waive
the anti-circumvention provision must be made in a "rulemaking proceeding[] consis-
tent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act").
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1998) ("No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
tide.")
107 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (B).
108 Though the Commerce Committee introduced this feature into § 1201, that
precise phrase did not appear in its version of the bill. See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA),
supra note 46, at 2-3 (giving the Commerce Committee's version of the bill). In addi-
tion, the conferees offer no explanation for the change. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-
796, at 64-65 (1998) (discussing the conferees' view of § 1201(a)) [hereinafter CONE.
REP. (DMCA)].
109 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (B).
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works" is narrower and more focused than all copyrightable works.110
It would seem, therefore, that the language should be applied to
discrete subgroups. If users of physics textbooks or listeners to Ba-
roque concerti, for example, find themselves constricted in the new
Internet environment, then some relief will lie. If, on the other hand,
the only problem shared by numerous disgruntled users is that each is
having trouble accessing copyrighted works, albeit of different genres,
no relief is warranted.
Even if the adverse effect-whether on textbook readers or any
other discrete class-does not currently pertain, that situation may not
remain static. Accordingly, the statute provides for various periods of
evaluation. The release from the basic provision applies not only to
currently disadvantaged users, but also to the extent that they are
likely to suffer that adverse effect during the succeeding evaluation
period."' The first relevant period runs from the date that the basic
provision takes effect (the discussion below explains that it is held in
abeyance until October 28, 2000) until two years thereafter (which
translates to October 28, 2002) . During that window, a rulemaking
procedure must take place, under the procedures described below.
Thereafter, during each three-year period,113 a new rulemaking pro-
ceeding must take place."
4
Considering first its bottom-line impact, each such rulemaking
proceeding leads to publication of "any class of copyrighted works for
which [the determination has been made] that noninfringing uses by
persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be,
adversely affected.""" That publication makes the basic provision out-
lawing circumvention of technological measures inapplicable "to such
110 See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 38 (stating that the particular
class of copyrighted works is a narrow subset of works of authorship identified in
17 U.S.C. § 102).
III See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (B) (stating that the prohibition in subparagraph (A)
will not apply to persons who are likely to be adversely affected in the succeeding
three-year period).
112 See infra Part IH.C.2.c (discussing the two-year abeyance of the effective date).
11 The first period runs for two years from the effective date of the WIPO Treaties
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (C). Thereafter, the relevant time is "each succeeding
3-year period." k
114 See id. (describing the procedures to be followed in "each succeeding 3-year pe-
riod"); see also COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 37 ("[O]n each occasion,
the assessment of adverse impacts on particular categories of works is to be determined
de novo.").
115 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (D).
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users with respect to such class of works."" 6 Thus, to continue the
previous example, it may develop that users of physics textbooks are
adversely affected by the new environment. If the evidence developed
during the rulemaking procedure is insufficient to determine whether
that adverse impact has taken place with respect to a particular class of
copyrighted works, then the basic provision goes into effect vis-ei-vis
that class. 1 7 Thus, equivocal evidence would prevent textbook readers
from freely accessing their favorite work on physics. In any event, this
safe harbor applies only during the three-year period to which the
rulemaking culminating in publication pertains."8
Turning to methodology, the determination whether a person is
likely to suffer an adverse effect under the statute, unlike most other
aspects of copyright law, is not simply determined by a court called
upon to adjudicate the operation of the statute. Instead, the statute
directs the Copyright" 9 Office2 0 to engage in "a rulemaking proceed-
ing on the record." 2 ' The statute enumerates five illustrative statutory
factors12 to be considered in determining whether users of a copy-
116 Id.
117 See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 38 ("If the rulemaking has pro-
duced insufficient evidence to determine whether there have been adverse impacts
with respect to particular classes of copyrighted materials, the circumvention prohibi-
tion should go into effect with respect to those classes.").
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (D) ("[T]he prohibition contained in subparagraph
(A) shall not apply to such users with respect to such class of works for the ensuing 3-
year period.").
9 The conferees rejected the Commerce Committee's earlier approach of vesting
responsibility in the Secretary of Commerce, who, in turn, was to consult with the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration. See COMMERCE REP.
(DMCA), supra note 46, at 37.
120 More specifically, the statute addresses "the Librarian of Congress, upon the
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce and
report and comment on his or her views in making such recommendation...." 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (C). The Conference Committee asserted that:
[i]t is the intention of the conferees that, as is typical with other rulemaking
under titie 17, and in recognition of the expertise of the Copyright Office, the
Register of Copyrights will conduct the rulemaking, including providing no-
tice of the rulemaking, seeking comments from the public, consulting with
the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Depart-
ment of Commerce and any other agencies that are deemed appropriate, and
recommending final regulations in the report to the Librarian.
CONF. REP. (DMCA), supra note 108, at 64.
121 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (C).
122 The statute directs the Librarian to examine the following factors:
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
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righted work mentioned above are indeed adversely affected'23 by the
ban on technological circumvention "in their ability to make nonin-
fringing uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted
works.", 24 The legislative history instructs the rulemaking proceedings
to focus on "distinct, verifiable and measurable impacts" that are not
simply "de minimis," and to "solicit input to consider a broad range of
evidence of past or likely adverse impacts."'2 It also directs that
"[a] dverse impacts that flow from other sources, or that are not clearly
attributable to implementation of a technological protection measure,
are outside the scope of the rulemaking."
126
In addition to the departure from normal practice just noted, the
scope of the rulemaking differs from most of the regulations promul-
gated by the Copyright Office or Librarian of Congress. Whereas
most rulemaking administers only technical aspects of copyright law,
the instant regulations take the additional step of exempting entire
educational purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for
or value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
Id. The last factor proves that the list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Note that
the absence of a comma after "nonprofit" in clause (ii) shows that it modifies each of
the uses that follow.
123 Alternatively, the statute directs the Librarian to inquire whether those users
"are likely to be [adversely affected] in the succeeding 3-year period." I&t
124 I& The House Commerce Report explains some of the underlying goals here:
The goal of the proceeding is to assess whether the implementation of tech-
nological protection measures that effectively control access to copyrighted
works is adversely affecting the ability of individual users to make lawful uses
of copyrighted works. Many such technological protection measures are in ef-
fect today- these include the use of "password codes" to control authorized
access to computer programs, for example, or encryption or scrambling of
cable programming, videocassettes, and CD-ROMs. More such measures can
be expected to be introduced in the near future. The primary goal of the
rulemaking proceeding is to assess whether the prevalence of these techno-
logical protections, with respect to particular categories of copyrighted mate-
rials, is diminishing the ability of individuals to use these works in ways that
are otherwise lawful.
COMMERcE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 37.
125 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 37.
16 Id Further, the Report provides that "[i]n each case, the focus must remain on
whether the implementation of technological protection measures (such as encryption
or scrambling) has caused adverse impact on the ability of users to make lawful uses."
I&
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categories of potential defendants from liability under the statute.
127
Therefore, to the extent that an aggrieved plaintiff believes that the
Librarian of Congress has erred, it would seem that her sole remedy is
to initiate a challenge to the rulemaking procedure pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act,128 rather than asking the court to de-
termine that, under a judicious application of the pertinent factors,
the defendant should be held culpable under the Copyright Act for
an anti-circumvention violation.
It is legitimate to reverse the question. One may therefore inquire
whether a defendant, whose usage failed to win recognition via the
Librarian's publication, can nonetheless urge, as a defense to liability
for an anti-circumvention violation under the Copyright Act, that his
exploitation falls within the statutory safe harbor. The wording of the
statute here opens the door for a court so inclined to evaluate the de-
fendant's conduct and the effect of his using the subject work. If the
factors for exemption are present, then that defendant, notwithstand-
ing his failure to fall within the published regulations, may be able to
prevail in arguing that he is exempt under the statute.1'29
Apart from defending against a charge of an anti-circumvention
violation, however, the statute directs that neither the exception from
liability, nor the whole rulemaking procedure, shall constitute a de-
fense for any purpose."'0 Thus, for example, a defendant whose usage
127 See 17 U.S.c. § 1201(a) (1) (D) (Supp. IV 1998) ("[T]he prohibition contained
in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to such users [identified pursuant to rulemaking]
128 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 7.21 [B] (discussingjudicial review under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act).
129 The argument emerges from the language that Congress used: "Neither the
exception under subparagraph (B) from the applicability of the prohibition contained
in subparagraph (A), nor any determination made in a rulemaking conducted under
subparagraph (C), may be used as a defense in any action to enforce any provision of
this title other than this paragraph." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (E). From that wording,
even a defendant who has failed to win publication under subparagraph (C), but who
convinces a court that he qualifies for the exception under subparagraph (B), is for-
bidden from urging that status under any doctrine of U.S. copyright law "other than
this paragraph." Id. The negative pregnant arises that he is allowed to urge the de-
fense under this paragraph. That the paragraph in question contains the basic provi-
sion compels the conclusion that a defendant may urge his qualification under sub-
paragraph (B), even absent publication under subparagraph (C), as a defense to a
charge that he engaged in a wrongful circumvention of a technological measure. Mili-
tating against that construction, though, subparagraph (B) itself sets forth: "as deter-
mined in subparagraph (C)." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (B). A court attempting to rec-
oncile these various provisions could seize on that language to reject the defendant's
activist construction of the statute.
ISO See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (E) (restricting defenses).
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wins exemption in pertinent rulemaking does not thereby gain any
mileage in urging a fair use defense to copyright infringement, 31 as
opposed to a defense to the instant charge of violating the basic provi-
sion of section 1201.32 Likewise, a defendant who convinces the court
that he falls within the exemption, even though not listed in the Li-
brarian's published rules, should not be heard to make headway in
any other feature of U.S. copyright law.
c. Effective Date
Although the basic provision is framed in absolute terms, the stat-
ute delays its implementation. In fact, the provision ex propio vigore
remains in abeyance for two years following enactment of the WIPO
Treaties Act. iss Therefore, the circumvention ban takes effect on Oc-
tober 28, 2000.
What was the reason for the delay? As we have just seen, the delay
serves as a building block for the user exemptions.'34 The main pur-
pose for the delay "is to allow the development of a sufficient record
as to how the implementation of these technologies is affecting avail-
ability of works in the marketplace for lawful uses."""
A separate issue arises in determining how long the protection
lasts. Is circumvention of a technical process forbidden only so long
as the work accessed thereby is subject to copyright protection, or
does the prohibition continue longer? To appreciate this aspect of
the matter requires an extended inquiry into the effective functioning
of section 1201. After considering other aspects of the statute, the
131 Would that conclusion follow in any event, because of the independent provi-
sion that "[n ] othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses
to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title?" 17 U.S.C. §
1201(c) (1). It would seem so, indicating that Congress adopted a "belt and suspend-
ers" approach here.
As previously noted, the field being plowed here is one of "paracopyright"
rather than copyright proper. See supra note 66 (citing Congress's recognition of a
"paracopyright" domain).
1ss The basic provision provides that it "shall take effect at the end of the 2-year
period beginning on the date of enactment." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (A). Both the
trafficking ban and additional violations sections lack comparable language. See 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2), (b). The conclusion thereupon follows that this delay applies to
only one of the three bans. See infra Part III.C.4.b (discussing the two-year delay in the
anti-circumvention provision).
13 See supra Part II.C.2.b (noting that the release from the anti-circumvention ban
applies to persons likely to suffer adverse effects from October 28, 2000, and for three
years thereafter).
35 CoMMRc REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 37.
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discussion below reverts to that inquiry.
D. Separate Application of Each Exemption to Each Ban
1. Brief Enumeration
As set forth above, section 1201 incorporates three anti-
circumvention bans: the basic provision, the trafficking ban, and the
additional violations.1 3 7 To appreciate the context of the specific ex-
emption protecting users' fair-use interests13 requires explicating the
distinctions among these three bans.
The discussion above has mentioned, in summary fashion, that
the bulk of section 1201 sets forth in painstaking detail a host of ex-
emptions applicable in various circumstances. 9 Although it goes be-
yond the scope of the current analysis to treat each exemption ex-
haustively, it is nonetheless telling to review them briefly and
separately with regard to whether each exemption applies to one, two,
or all three of the anti-circumvention bans.
(1) The exemption in favor of nonprofit libraries, archives, and
educational institutions applies only to the basic provision.40 It fur-
nishes no defense to the trafficking and additional violations.
The upshot is that a library can obtain unauthorized access to a copy-
righted work through this vehicle, but cannot manufacture or distribute
devices or systems that either facilitate that access, or that take works to
which access has been granted and defeat use restrictions put in place by
• . .141
the copyright owner.
(2) The provision allowing for the deactivation of "cookies"'
42
likewise attaches only to the basic provision, rather than to the other
two.'4 Even "if an engineer were to offer a service or component
IS See infra Part llI.C.4.a (considering application of the basic provision after the
initial three-year period).
137 See supra Part II.B (enumerating and discussing the three bans).
138 See supra Part Il.C.2 (delineating the theory, application, and effective date of
the user exemption).
139 See supra Part II.C.1. For a full-scale analysis of these various provisions, see 3
NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 12A.04-12A.05.
140 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that exempted institutions
'shall not be in violation of subsection (a) (1) (A)").
141 3 NiMMR, supra note 4, § 12A.04[A] [1] (footnote omitted).
142 "'Cookies' refer to client-side persistent information that allow a web site to
learn information about you every time you log on." Nimmer, Aus der Neuen Wel, supra
note 43, at 206.
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1) (providing exemption "[n]otwithstanding the provi-
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whose sole function is to disable technological measures that intrude
on users' privacy, [the lack of an exemption to the trafficking ban
means that as] drafted, there is no protection for her."' 4
The other exemptions in the statute are less parsimonious.
(3) The exemption for law enforcement and intelligence gathering
acts as an exception to section 1201 as a whole.J It therefore serves
as a limitation on each of the three bans.4
(4) One portion of the reverse engineering exemption applies to
the basic provision.47 A separate portion applies to the other two
bans. (5) One portion of the encryption exemption applies to the
basic provision, 9 and another to the ban on trafficking.' There is,
however, no exemption here from the additional violations. (6) By
the same token, the exemptions for security testing apply to the basic
provision and trafficking ban but not to the additional violations.'
(7) The same applies to section 1201's solicitude for minors. 2
2. Obligation to Discriminate
This summary reveals that some of section 1201's exemptions ap-
ply to the basic provision alone, others to this provision along with the
trafficking ban, and others still to all three anti-circumvention bans.
What systematic artifice is at work here, calling forth sometimes the
need for an exemption to reach one ban, at other times two, and at
still others three? Why is it that the reverse engineering exemption
sions of subsection (a) (1) (A)").
14 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.05[B] [1].
145 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (applying the law enforcement exemption to all of
§ 1201).
146 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, §12A.04[B] ("[A]lI three anti-circumvention fea-
tres... do not apply to such lawfully authorized governmental information security
activities." (footnote omitted)).
147 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1) (allowing the exemption "[n]otwithstanding the pro-
visions of subsection (a) (1) (A)").
148 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2) (providing an exemption "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of subsections (a) (2) and (b)").
149 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2) (creating the exemption "[n]otwithstanding the pro-
visions of subsection (a) (1) (A)').
150 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (4) (applying the exemption "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (a) (2)").
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (2) (providing exemptions "[n]otwithstanding the provi-
sions of subsection (a) (1) (A)");, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (4) ("[n]otwithstanding the provi-
sions of subsection (a) (2)").
152 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (applying exception to "subsection (a)"). For some of
the difficulties in applying that provision, see Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium
CopyightAct, supra note 1, at 405-12.
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applies to the additional violations, but the corresponding one for en-
cryption research does not? Why can companies traffic in anti-
circumvention devices designed to facilitate security testing, but not
those designed to facilitate library browsing? These global questions
find no answer in either the statute itself or its legislative history.
Nonetheless, given the attention that has been paid to calibrating
the scope of each exemption, Congress would certainly appear to have
intended attention to precisely which ban is at issue in any given in-
stance. In other words, just because a user's conduct falls within a
statutory exemption does not mean that he can ignore all of section
1201. He is instead at liberty to ignore solely those particular bans to
which his precise exemption applies.
Accordingly, courts should carefully apply each exemption solely
to its specified reach-unless, perhaps, the very structure of the WIPO
Treaties Act rebels at such a construction. Is there such an instance?
The answer requires an extended inquiry into the statutory exemption
113
designed to vindicate fair use.
III. FAIR USE
A. General Solicitude for User Rights
The thrust of section 1201, as explained above, is to create three
anti-circumvention bans, in order to strengthen copyright proprie-
tors.'4 Other portions of that same section, however, also protect fair
use. One subsection is designed to ensure that the judicial extension
of fair use to reverse engineering not be undercut' 5 5 Previous case
law safeguards over-the-air taping of analog television programming as
within the fair use doctrine;6 another aspect of section 1201 ensures
153 See supra Part II.C.2.b (discussing application of statutory exemptions in
§ 1201).
15 See supra Part II.B. (explaining the three prohibitions on use).
155 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (describing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (f)'s protection of reverse engineering). On reverse engineering as fair use un-
der previous law, see Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-21 (9th Cir.
1992), which held that reverse engineering was fair use under the Copyright Act of
1976. See generally 4 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05 [D] [4] (describing reverse engineer-
ing and analyzing case law on the issue of whether it constitutes fair use). The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's attempt to continue that protected status in this realm is
largely, though not completely, realized. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.04[C] [3]
(describing the Digital Millenium Copyright Act's limitation of reverse engineering to
interoperability, which is narrower than previous law).
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55
(1984) (concluding that "home time-shifting is fair use").
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the continuation of that interpretation as well.. Of course, given how
large fair use looms in copyright doctrine," it received extended dis-
cussion in the legislative history for section 1201, particularly in the
Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives. 9 For that
reason, the analysis below confronts it at length16
In addition to fair use, the WIPO Treaties Act contains other fea-
tures safeguarding user rights. Notable among them are the follow-
ing:
" The House Commerce Committee added to section 1201 solici-
tude for user privacy. Thus, websurfers may deactivate the
"cookies" 161 that would otherwise leave telltale crumbs as to
their wanderings.62
" It similarly added features to section 1201 to safeguard reverse
engineering, encryption research, and security testing.
63
" The provision following section 1201, protecting copyright
management information, likewise contains features designed
to protect the privacy of users.'64
" The remedial provisions of the WIPO Treaties Act similarly
evince a nuanced approach to copyright legislation. Most no-
tably, the House Commerce Committee included a sensitivity
that the First Amendment not be trampled when authorizing
courts to enjoin violations of section 1201 and section 1202.'6
157 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.06[B] (explaining that § 1201(k) (1) allows
consumers to make analog copies of programming, with some exceptions).
158 The Supreme Court has handed down more rulings on fair use than on any
other aspect of copyright law. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05 [B] [3] (reviewing a
number of Supreme Court decisions on the scope of the fair use doctrine).
159 See supra note 96 (citing lengthy excerpts of the House Committee Report).
160 See infra Part HI.C (discussing "pay-per-use").
161 See supra note 142 (defining "cookies").
162 The legislative history itself underscores this point
H.R. 2281, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, contains numerous
protections to protect the rights of copyright owners to ensure that they feel
secure in releasing their works in a digital, on-line environment. The Com-
mittee on Commerce, however, believes that in reaching to protect the rights
of copyright owners, Congress need not encroach upon the privacy interests
of consumers.
COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 27.
163 See supra Part II.D.1 (enumerating the application of each exemption).
IrA See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (Supp. IV 1998) ("[T]he term 'copyright management
information' ... does not include any personally identifying information about a user
of a work.. ").
165 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1998) (forbidding district courts to "im-
20001
704 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:673
Simultaneously, other features of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act limit copyright owners' rights in order to preserve copyright
law's delicate balance. 66 Countervailing Title I of the omnibus law
(the WIPO Treaties Act), which in general expands the rights of copy-
right owners,167 title II (the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act) in general constricts those rights.'68
Other features of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act likewise
demonstrate the same sensitivity. For instance, title III allows owners
of computer systems to engage in repairs, over the objections of any
software proprietor.'69 Title IV expands the interest of "libraries and
archives to permit them to use the latest technology to preserve dete-
riorating manuscripts and other works."170 The amendment's man-
date for study of distance learning17 1 likewise manifests solicitude for
the importance of user rights, as opposed to owner rights.1
B. Practical Implementations in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Outside Section 1201
The discussion above has addressed section 1201, which qualifies
as the heart of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.73 As also noted,
pose a prior restraint on free speech or the press"); see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 12A. 11 [B] (discussing the ramifications of this limitation on the power to issue in-
junctions).
166 For an extended ode to copyright law's "delicate balance," see David Nimmer et
al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 17 (1999).
167 The matter is, of course, more complicated. Particular features of the WIPO
Treaties Act itself serve the complementary interest of users rather than of copyright
owners, as the discussion above explains.
168 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, at ch. 12B (discussing in detail the effects of the On-
line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act on previously existing copyright
law).
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
170 COMMERcE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 21; see also 17 U.S.C. § 108(c) (Supp.
V 1998) (providing that a library or archive may make a single copy of a published
work if the sole purpose is to replace a damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen copy).
171 See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 403, 112 Stat. 2860,
2889 (1998) (indicating that by six months from the passage of the Act, a report shall
be submitted to Congress recommending how to promote distance education through
digital technologies).
17 See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 21 ("With these proposed revi-
sions, the Committee believes it has appropriately balanced the interests of content
owners, on-line and other service providers, and information users.").
173 See supra Part II.
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however, that enactment contains vastly greater features. 74 Adverting
to two of these-one that explicitly adverts to section 1201, one that
does not-helps set the stage for the amendment's contrasting treat-
ment of threats to fair use from a "pay-per-use" world.175
1. Ephemeral Recordings
The 1976 Act confronted the problem of ephemeral recordings:
"[W]here a broadcaster has the privilege of performing or displaying
a work either because he is licensed or because the performance or
display is exempted under the statute, the question is whether he
should be given the additional privilege of recording the performance
or display to facilitate its transmission."1 78 Given the practical exigen-
cies of broadcasting, Congress adopted section 112 (a) to exempt such
ephemeral recordings from liability.17
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act adds new weapons against
the circumvention of technological measures.17 With that addition to
the copyright owner's arsenal, the ephemeral recording exemption
could be rendered nugatory. Proprietors wishing to forestall repro-
duction could encrypt or otherwise protect their works, and then file
suit under section 1201 against those who disabled that protection in
order to reproduce the work as entitled via the ephemeral recordings
exemption.17 To deactivate that eventuality, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act itself adds a provision to the ephemeral recording ex-
emption. The provision directs any copyright owner who employs
technical measures preventing legitimate exercise of the ephemeral
recordings exemption80 to "make available to the transmitting organi-
174 See supra Part III.A (canvassing aspects of the statute apart from § 1201).
175 See infra Part B.C (analyzing impact of "pay-per-use" world).
176 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 101 (1976).
'1n See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. IV 1998) (permitting broadcasters to make one copy
of such a performance).
178 See supra Part II.B (describing the three newly created anti-circumvention bans).
179 The legislative history provides:
Concerns were expressed that if use of copy protection technologies became
widespread, a transmitting organization might be prevented from engaging in
its traditional activities of assembling transmission programs and making
ephemeral recordings permitted by Section 112 for purposes of its own
transmissions within its local service area and of archival preservation and se-
curity.
CotMmERcE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 67; S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 59;
CONF. REP. (DMCA), supra note 108, at 78.
ISO See 17 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2) (1995), amended by Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 402(5), 112 Stat. 2860, 2888 (1998) (referring to "the applica-
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zation the necessary means for permitting the making of such copy or
phonorecord" as the exemption permits.1' This requirement, how-
ever, applies only "if it is technologically feasible and economically
reasonable for the copyright owner to do so.""
What if the copyright owner neglects to make the necessary means
available? In that case, the statute does not provide a private right of
action against that copyright owner. Instead, it affords self-help to the
transmitting organization, specifying that it will not be liable for an
anti-circumvention violation l8 "for engaging in such activities as are
necessary to make such copies or phonorecords as permitted" under
the ephemeral recordings exemption.'8 4 This remedy is triggered
whenever the copyright owner fails to act "in a timely manner in light
of the transmitting organization's reasonable business require-
ments."185
What if technical measures are in place that prevent a transmitting
organization from making the type of ephemeral reproduction that
the statute allows and the copyright owner refuses to furnish the nec-
essary means to make the subject copy-but the owner maintains that
its reason for refusal is that compliance with the request would be
economically unreasonable? Under these circumstances, the statute
does not clearly address whether the stymied transmitting organiza-




18s See id. (providing that transmitting organization "shall not be liable for a viola-
tion of section 1201 (a) (1) of this title"). The cross-referenced section contains both
the basic provision and the ban on trafficking, although not the additional violations.
See sura Part II.B (articulating the extent of § 1201's protections).
17 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2). The legislative history sets forth an extended example:
By way of example, if a radio station could not make a permitted ephemeral
recording from a commercially available phonorecord without violating sec-
tion 1201(a)(1), then the radio station could request from the copyright
owner the necessary means of making a permitted ephemeral recording. If
the copyright owner did not then either provide a phonorecord that could be
reproduced or otherwise provide the necessary means of making a permitted
ephemeral recording from the phonorecord already in the possession of the
radio station, the radio station would not be liable for violating section
1201(a) (1) for taking the steps necessary for engaging in activities permitted
under section 112 (a) (1). The radio station would, of course, be liable for vio-
lating section 1201 (a) (1) if it engaged in activities prohibited by that section
in other than the limited circumstances permitted by section 112 (a) (1).
S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 59-60; CONF. REP. (DMCA), supra note 108, at 78-79;
see COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 67 (discussing the radio station exam-
ple).18 17 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2).
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tion can nevertheless engage in self-help.8 6 On the one hand, the
copyright owner has not done anything wrong, as its obligations cease
when technological feasibility or economic reasonableness so dictate.
On the other hand, disallowing the transmitting organization from
acting under those circumstances causes it to lose the benefit of the
ephemeral recording exemption through no fault of its own. For that
reason, the better view would seem to be that the transmitting organi-
zation may respond to such intransigence, even if reasonable from the
copyright owner's perspective, by engaging in self-help.
187
This scheme furnishes one potential blueprint for application to
section 1201. Congress could have extended to the anti-
circumvention features a provision, like the one that it made applica-
ble to ephemeral recordings, requiring a copyright owner who uses
technical measures to subvert conduct authorized by the Copyright
Act to provide the means to overcome that measure for parties acting
within the scope of their rights. It could have clothed parties who
found themselves stymied by overreaching on the part of content
owners with self-help remedies, along the lines we have just observed
in the instant context Congress acted differently, however, when it




In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., a unanimous Su-
preme Court struck down a state law protecting the design of boat
18 The statute allows self-help when "the copyright owner fails to do so in a timely
manner." Id. (emphasis added). The question arises as to the referent of"so"-does it
mean to "make available to the transmitting organization the necessary means for
permitting the making of such copy or phonorecord?" Id. Or does it refer to doing so
only "if it is technologically feasible and economically reasonable for the copyright
owner to do so?" Id. The statute could be read to support either interpretation, giving
rise to opposite conclusions.
187 Presumably, the dispute would become operative only if such circumvention is
technologically feasible and economically reasonable, from the perspective of the transmit-
ting organization. Otherwise, itwould be cheaper for that organization simply to forego
the benefits of the ephemeral reproduction exemption, and the issue would never
ripen into a concrete fact pattern.
18 See infra Part I.0 (discussing how the digital revolution places stress on the
public's ability to browse published works).
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hulls.' 9 After that decision, designers of boat hulls were powerless to
secure protection for their handiwork via state law.90 To battle those
"who indulge in a marine industry known as 'hull splashing,'"'19 they
turned instead to Congress for protection.' 92 Congress responded by
enacting the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act,193 Title V of the Digital
189 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (striking down a Florida plug-molding statute, which
prohibited the process by which a boat hull is made by casting a competitor's mold).
190 Clearly, the Court did not view the absence of protection in this realm as a so-
cial evil begging for redress:
The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be an essential
part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic design. Variations as to size
and combination of various elements may lead to significant advances in the
field. Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public
domain often leads to significant advances in technology. If Florida may pro-
hibit this particular method of study and recomposition of an unpatented ar-
ticle, we fail to see the principle that would prohibit a State from banning the
use of chromatography in the reconstitution of unpatented chemical com-
pounds, or the use of robotics in the duplication of machinery in the public
domain.
Id. at 160.
191 H.R. REP. No. 105-486, at 10 (1998).
192The congressional report offers only a few conclusory sentences on the eco-
nomic rationale for this new scheme:
"Hull splashing" is a problem for consumers, as well as manufacturers and
boat design firms. Consumers who purchase copied boats are defrauded in
the sense that they are not benefitting from the many attributes of hull design,
other than shape, that are structurally relevant, including those related to
quality and safety. It is also highly unlikely that consumer [sic] know that a
boat has been copied from an existing design. Most importantly for the pur-
poses of promoting intellectual property rights, if manufacturers are not per-
mitted to recoup at least some of their research and development costs, they
may no longer invest in new, innovative boat designs that boaters eagerly
await.
Id. at 13 (1998). An equally brief criticism is that if the concern here were truly safety,
then Congress would have been better advised to address it directly rather than
through the proxy of a new species of intellectual property (leading to further ques-
tions: Are splashed hulls invariably unsafe? Usually? Sometimes? Are unsplashed
ones safe?). Additionally, if consumers are in fact purchasing the design that appeals
to their eyes, it is unclear why their ignorance of copying diminishes their well-being.
As to the proper structure of economic incentives-the concern that, evidently,
motivated Congress here-the report is remarkable for its failure to document the is-
sue through citation to any empirical research. Congress evidently adopted the expe-
dient of "legislate now, evaluate later." Rather than conducting an investigation into
past effects, it directs a study as to the future impact of the Vessel Hull Design Protec-
tion Act. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304 § 504(a), 112 Stat.
2860, 2917 (1998) (requiring the Register of Copyrights and the Commissioner of Pat-
ents and Trademarks to submit to Congress ajoint report evaluating the effect of the
1998 amendments).
193 Digital Millenium CopyrightAct, § 501, 112 Stat. at 2905.
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Millennium Copyright Act.19 4 That amendment to the Copyright Act
confers a circumscribed form of sui generis protection on designs, lim-
ited to the realm of boat hulls.95
Infringing conduct under the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act
consists of selling protected vessel designs without the consent of the
owner or distributing them for sale or for use in trade.196 Likewise, it
is an infringement to "make, have made, or import for sale, or for use
in trade, any [such] infringing article.",
97
The Vessel Hull Design Protection Act contains special strictures
for the liability of sellers and distributors. Assuming that she neither
made nor imported the subject article, a seller or distributor is
deemed to have infringed a protected design only if she "induced or
acted in collusion with a manufacturer to make, or an importer to im-
port, such article."'95 For these purposes, however, "merely purchas-
ing or giving an order to purchase such article in the ordinary course
of business shall not of itself constitute such inducement or collu-
sion."'9
This scheme furnishes another possible blueprint for section
1201. Congress could have crafted the and-circumvention features, as
it did for boat hulls, such that a party who is not the primary malefac-
19 For a general discussion, see 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 8A.13-8A.21.
195 See 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (a) (2) (Supp. IV 1998) (stating that the design of a vessel
hull is subject to protection under the Act).
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 1309(a) (2) (prohibiting the sale, distribution, and use in trade
of a protected vessel design).
19 17 U.S.C. § 1309(a) (1).
IN 17 U.S.C. § 1309(b)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 105-436 at 17 (1998) ("[A] seller or
distributor will only be held liable if he or she colluded with a manufacturer or an im-
porter to infringe ....").
199 17 U.S.C. § 1309(b) (1). Although Congress crafted the previous provision to
immunize sellers and distributors, it did not wish to allow them to flaunt design protec-
tion completely. Accordingly, a seller or distributor that refuses to make a prompt and
full disclosure of its source for that infringing item, despite having been requested by
the design's owner to do so, exposes itself to danger. See 17 U.S.C. § 1309(b) (2) (stat-
ing that a seller or distributor will be deemed an infringer if he "refused or failed,
upon the request of the owner of the design, to make a prompt and full disclosure of
that person's source of such article"). This exposure, however, matures into actual in-
fringement liability only when the seller or distributor "orders or reorders such article
after receiving notice by registered or certified mail of the protection subsisting in the
design." IM.
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tor20 attracts liability only if she "induced or acted in collusion with"
that bad actor.20' Once again,0 2 however, Congress acted differently
when it came to solicitude for the fair use rights implicated by section
1201 as will soon become apparent.
2°3
C. Reacting to a "Pay-Per-Use" World
The discussion above delineates how section 1201 protects theS204
rights of users in the digital environmen As previously noted,
Congress purported to adopt a "fail-safe" mechanism safeguarding fair25
use.205 An evaluation of that policy safeguard is necessary to test




Historically, copyright owners have always had the right to retain
their works confidentially.2 7  "The owner of the copyright, if he
pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content himself
with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his
property."2 0 1 In this manner, United States law has accorded de facto
recognition to the branch of moral rights called the droit de divulga-
tion.2°9 Once those same owners consented to initial publication of the
200 In the context of the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, the primary miscreant
is one who made or imported the subject article. See 17 U.S.C. § 1309(b) (1) (stating
that sellers or distributors infringe on a design when they are "induced or acted in col-
lusion with a manufacturer to make, or an importer to import, such article . . . ."). In
the case of § 1201, the bad actor is the one who engages in the subject "breaking and
entering" by gaining unauthorized access to a work which the copyright owner techno-
logically shielded. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the act of "breaking and entering"
by circumventing technological protection devices).
201 See supra text accompanying note 198.
202 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing ephemeral recordings).
203 See infra Part 1I.C (discussing the fair use doctrine and the safeguarding of user
access to restricted works in the context of § 1201).
204 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing user exemptions to § 1201).
205 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 36. See supra text accompanying
note 97 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 105-551).
206 Compare supra Part II.C.2.b (discussing the specific user exemption to users of a
copyrighted work within a particular class of works), with infra Part III.C.4 (arguing
that § 1201 does not properly protect user interests).
207 See4 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05[A][2] [b] ("The scope of the fair use doc-
trine is considerably narrower with respect to unpublished works that are held confi-
dential....").
208 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
20 See 3 NIMmER, supra note 4, § 8D.05[A] ("The right [of the author to control
initial dissemination] is nothing other than an American analog to France's droit de
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work, however, they have historically lost control over its subsequent
flow. The first sale doctrine prevented them from barring or demand-
ing a royalty upon subsequent disposition of published copies. 210 The
fair use doctrine prevented them from barring or demanding a royalty
from such activities as miscellaneous quotations in the context of a re-
view.2 In this manner, traditional copyright law accorded the public
substantial leeway in browsing published works.2
The digital revolution places unprecedented stress on those
213browsing activities. Potentially, it allows copyright owners to control
the flow not merely of their unpublished manuscripts,21 4 but more im-
portantly, of their published works as well.2 5 If copyright owners
package their "published"2 16 goods in digital envelopes accessible only
through passwords, then perhaps they can, indeed, levy a unilateral
See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (exempting transfer of a particular
copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner's exclusive rights); 2 NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 8.12[B] (discussing the first sale doctrine as embodied in § 109(a)).
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (laying out the factors of fair use); 4NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 13.05[A] (discussing the factors of fair use).
212 In a future world of convergence, it is difficult to distinguish the various strands
of traditional law, such as fair use, the first sale doctrine, and other matters, such as
those inherent in the idea-expression dichotomy. Following the lead of the Copyright
Office, "we will refer to all of these user privileges collectively as fair use interests."
1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at 48 n.1 (statement of Register of Copy-
rights Peters).
213 SeeJessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29
(1994) (discussing the possible fall-out of the view that the act of reading a work into a
computer's random access memory creates a reproduction of that work, thereby in-
fringing the copyright).
14 Cf Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)
(holding that it is unfair, and therefore infringement, to copy an excerpt from Presi-
dent Ford's unpublished memoirs); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that it is not a fair use to quote lengthy excerpts from private
letters of reclusive author), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
215 If the basic provision of § 1201 applied solely to unpublished works and the ad-
ditional violations of § 1201 applied solely to published works, then all fair use con-
cerns would evaporate, given that the additional violations are already structured to
safeguard legitimate acts of fair use. See infra text accompanying note 236 (discussing
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 18). The problem, however, is that the basic provision can also
apply to published but encrypted works. See 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90,
at 229 (statement of Rep. Frank) (stating his concern about the dissipation of the fair
use doctrine to published works that are encrypted).
216 Though that word may be anachronistic in the Internet context, the policy im-
plications are not. See Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, supra
note 25 (describing the distinction between published and unpublished works as a
product of paper publication which will disappear with the coming of the electronic
age unless deliberately maintained).
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royalty upon such activities as resales and reviews.1 7 At issue here are
both factual and legal variables. The former involves a prediction as
to the future of technology; the latter demands unprecedented atten-
tion to the legal status of such browsing activities as were previously
218simply beyond practical redress.
Consider the factual angle. Publishers are free to take old works
that have fallen into the public domain, to add a bit of original mate-
rial to them, and to claim a copyright in the newly released whole. 2°
Thus, for example, they could collect all cookbooks published in the
nineteenth century, write a new introduction to each, and then wrap
the product in a digital envelope. The resulting product, considered
as a whole, would be subject to copyright protection.2' Whether that
product holds any promise or not, however, depends on how technol-
217 See 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at 291 (statement of Rep. Lof-
gren) (discussing the possibility).
218 Because the subject matter under discussion implicates so directly the first sale
doctrine as applied to digital copies, it is relevant to inquire whether there exists such a
thing as a "digital first sale defense," a matter subject to argument. See 144 CONG. REc.
H7098 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher, quoting letter from
Chairman Coble) ("In my opinion, this extension of the first sale doctrine is antitheti-
cal to the policies the doctrine was intended to further."); Nimmer, supra note 216, at
9, 33 (posing this question); Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand,
supra note 166, at 39-40 (arguing for the existence of such a defense).
219 Note that the standard for copyrightability is low. See Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) ("Originality requires only that the
author make the selection or arrangement independently.., and that it display some
minimal level of creativity."); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d
Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("While a copy of something in the public domain will not, if it
be merely a copy, support a copyright, a distinguishable variation will." (citing Ger-
laen-Barklow v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927))).
220 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998) (defining "derivative work" as "a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version... or any other form in which a
work can be recast, transformed, or adapted"). See generally 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, at
ch. 3 (discussing derivative and collective works).
221 Note that this copyright would not furnish any basis for protecting the underly-
ing public domain materials standing by themselves. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, at §
3.04[A] ("[Clopyright in a derivative or collective work covers only those elements
contained therein that are original with the copyright claimant. That is, a derivative or
collected work copyright does not per se render protectible the preexisting or underly-
ing work upon which the later work is based."). By promiscuously mixing unprotected
with protectible material, however, the publisher may attempt to ratchet up its rights.
Cf Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 674, 681 & n.4 (2d Cir.
1998) (involving a case in which a party "claimed some creativity in its corrections to
the text of opinions" by selecting "parallel and alternative citations," and at one point
claimed copyright protection on that basis over what otherwise would have been public
domain judicial opinions), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999). This discussion evalu-
ates the efficacy of those efforts.
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ogy develops.
If lending libraries continue to flourish, then anyone with a burn-
ing interest in how shrimp was cooked in fin de side New Orleans
could simply check out the relevant volume from her local repository.
There is no reason for her to pay to access the digital product-unless
she specifically wishes to read the newly composed introductions, as
opposed to the underlying books.
On the other hand, if the world develops such that a trip to the li-
brary becomes as common as sending messages via the Pony Express,
then a different dynamic pertains. If access to works via electronic or
photo-optical means becomes the universal norm, and if the only way
that the pertinent network allows users to view any instantiation of
Louisiana cookbooks of the 1890s is through payment of a fee, then
royalties to the publisher of the electronic cookbook would become
essentially mandatory.2 By the same token, if in tomorrow's world
only antiquarians maintain phonographs and CD players, the sole ef-
fective way to hear an old recording of music might be through the
same network service. To the extent that the service charged the same
access fee for early 1920s jazz recordings as for new recordings subject
to copyright protection, the effective result would be to convert public
domain works into royalty-generating items.4
In short, depending on how the future unfolds, concern about
fair use in the digital environment could range from pointless to vital.
The latter scenario requires payment to gain access even to works that
nominally lie in the public domain, such as works from centuries past,
even if the purpose of the access is for one that the law favors, such as
to quote a few sentences for scholarly purposes. Under that scenario,
the work itself is effectively placed under lock and key, and the pro-
= Of course, to the extent that a user wants to review the copyrighted introduc-
tion, the law has every reason to validate charges that the copyright owner wishes to
impose for that access.
This nightmare scenario includes "the elimination of print or other hard-copy
versions, the permanent encryption of all electronic copies, and the adoption of busi-
ness models that depend upon restricting distribution and availability, rather than
upon maximizing it." COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 36. For another view
of the dangers, see Nimmer, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, supra note 166,
at 20-21, which offers a "Cautionary Tale" about the death of copyright in a completely
wired world.
24 Note that as a matter of copyright duration, neither music nor sound record-
ings published in 1922 or earlier are entitled to any federal copyright protection. See 3
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.11 [C] (stating that "all works that gained statutory copyright
fromJanuary 1, 1923, onwards... now stand to remain subject to copyright protection
until December 31, 2018, at the earliest").
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prietor can charge simply for the initial act of access. Thus arises what
one senator calls "the specter of moving our Nation towards a 'pay-
per-use' society."2 5
In turn, the legal issue arises of how to conceptualize the browsing
activities of users in decades past.2 6 Why is it that reviewers could tra-
ditionally quote scattered passages from copyrighted works? Is it be-
cause they had a right to do so?227 Could chefs review the techniques
of their predecessors as contained in published cookbooks of the past
as a matter of right? If so, was the right of constitutional magnitude,
safeguarding First Amendment interests of free speech and the ad-
vancement of knowledge? 2 8 Or did the law simply allow those activi-
ties, as it would have been economically unproductive to pursue such
small scale utilization?2
These fundamental questions exert practical consequences. Un-
der the first point of view, any danger to the public's right to browse
posed by the digital environment must be negated.us In other words,
if users have a constitutional right to quote for fair use purposes, then
Congress was under an obligation to frame section 1201 in a manner
that preserves that right.2 1 Under the second point of view, by con-
W 144 CONG. REC. S11887 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
226 The legal questions actually run deeper. Before even reaching the fair use de-
fense, how should one categorize the privileges that copyright law accords to authors
themselves? To quote Macaulay's famous speech to the House of Commons on Febru-
ary 5, 1841, "Is this a question of expediency, or is it a question of right?" F. William
Grosheide, Dutch Copyright: Right or Expediency (1817-1912 and After), in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTYAND INFORMATION LAW 175, 176 (JanJ.C. Kabel & GerardJ.H.M. Mom eds.,
1998).
227 See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996)
(Birch, J.) ("Although the traditional approach is to view 'fair use' as an affirmative
defense, this writer, speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed
as a right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976.")
228 See generally 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.10 (discussing First Amendment limita-
tions on copyright).
See WendyJ. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analy-
sis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1605 (1982) (argu-
ing that finding of fair use is appropriate when market failure is present).
no SeeJonathan Dowell, Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use in
a Digital World, 86 CAL. L. REV. 843, 874-76 (1998) (arguing that use of copyright in the
digital environment from an anti-dissemination motive should be subject to height-
ened fair use scrutiny). For an argument that public domain considerations are to be
favored with respect to old works digitally exploited, see Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright
Protectionism and Its Discontents: The Case ofJames Joyce's Ulysses in America, 108 YALE LJ.
633, 663-67 (1998), which states that the "public domain also promises a rich afterlife
of unimagined creativity."
231 Barney Frank constituted a one-man cheering section for the First Amendment
during deliberation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. On the House floor, he
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trast, the marketplace can be left to develop 23-- if browsing rights are
extinguished in the process, the only lesson to derive is that the eco-
nomics evidently have changed. Congress, under this viewpoint, need
not embody into section 1201 any special solicitude for user rights.
How did Congress actually view the matter in deliberating the
WIPO Treaties Act?23 The committees charged with deliberating the
bill addressed the matter at length, as did many individual legisla-
tors.2M
alone called attention to the technological progression of speech from books to radio
to the Internet, and the need to evince sensitivity to speech in the new environment.
See 144 CONG. REC. H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Frank) (noting
the technological progression and urging strong constitutional protection for elec-
tronically transmitted speech); see also id. H7101 (statement of Rep. Frank) (juxtapos-
ing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act against Communications Decency Act, and
condemning "danger in some other legislation of our continuing the unfortunate ten-
dency of holding electronically transmitted speech to a lesser standard of protection");
144 CONG. REc. H10618 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Frank) ("[We
are developing a second line of law which says electronically-transmitted speech is not
as constitutionally protected.").
Note, however, that another speaker expressed similar concerns, but without ex-
plicitly invoking the First Amendment: "[T]hese protections from a permanent pay-
per-view world ought to be maintained. Copyright is not just about protecting infor-
mation. It'sjust as much about affording reasonable access to it as a means of keeping
our democracy healthy...." Id. at H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Bliley) (internal quotations omitted); See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (showing how copyright, through
its encouragement of the production of "sustained works of authorship," serves the
underlying purposes of democracy); 1 NRAMER, supra note 4, § 1.10[A] n.2.1 (discuss-
ing the need to reconcile copyright and the First Amendment).
2S2 Moreover, the marketplace does not exhaust the desiderata at issue here. See
Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Manage-
ment," 97 MIcH. L. REv. 462, 552, 558 (1998) (stating that creative works implicate
preferences "that are fundamentally external to the market," and drawing a distinction
between maximizing the good of citizens as opposed to maximizing the good of consum-
ers). See generally Netanel, supra note 231, at 288 (presenting "a conceptual framework
for copyright that stands in opposition to both the expansionism of neoclassicist eco-
nomics and the minimalism of many critics").
233 It is not the task of this article to espouse a particular taxonomy (or to formu-
late a new one) as to where fair use rights lie in the hierarchy of values. Instead, the
exercise here is to test Congress's handiwork in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
against its self-stated goals.
By the same token, this Article does not purport to examine any outside forces that
were brought to bear in the lobbying process of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Cf Eben Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 CoLum. L. REv. 945, 948 (1997) (identifying
'unarticulated assumptions... flying too low for our radar" that led to adoption of
Telecommunications Act of 1996). Instead, this Article takes Congress' pronounce-
ments at face value and tests the extent to which they find realization in the language
and structure of the statute.
2H The question at issue here arises not under international law, but solely as a
matter of Congress's drafting choices, as "the treaties themselves.., give us all of the
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2. Formulation by Congress
a. House Judiciary Committee
As reported by the House Judiciary Committee, the basic provi-
sion was intended to impose absolute liability against those who lack
235authorized access. It was only when the subject access was author-
ized that "the traditional defenses to copyright infringement, includ-
ing fair use, would be fully applicable."2 The upshot is that fair use
would apply only following lawful access, not as a basis for obtaining
such access in the first instance. "[A] n individual would not be able to
circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would





This point of view recognizes absolute property ownership. There
is nothing inherently contradictory or illegitimate in the House Judi-
ciary Committee's approach. Indeed, it enjoys an illustrious pedigree,
tracing back to the resolution reached by the Rif at the beginning of
latitude that we need to protect our traditional legal approaches to the fair use doc-
trine." S. EXEc. REP. No. 105-25, at 31 (1998) (statement of Alan P. Larson, Asst. Sec.
of State for Economic and Business Affairs).
25 See supra note 103 (noting that the basic provision was absolute prior to the
Commerce Committee's amendment).
2 H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 18.
237 Id. The Chairman of the subcommittee responsible for preparing this report
elaborated on this point at some length, while explaining to Representative Boucher
his reasons for rejecting that dissenter's proposed amendment. See 144 CONG. REc.
H7097 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher, incorporating letter from
Chairman Coble) (discussing fair use and circumvention); see also infra Part III.C.2.b
(discussing the views of the House Commerce Committee). Explaining that the WIPO
Copyright Act deals separately with technological measures preventing access and with
those preventing copying, the chairman noted that with respect to the latter alone "the
bill contained no prohibition on the act of circumbention [sic] itself, leaving users free
to circumvent such measures in order to make fair use copies." 144 CONG. REC. H7097
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher, incorporating letter from Chair-
man Coble). He also explained his concern that Representative Boucher's amend-
ment
would grant to users a right never before alowed-free access to copyrighted
works in order to make a fair use. I believe this is unwise policy and tilts the
balance away from the protection of works in a free market economy toward
the free provision of works to anyone claiming to make a fair use.
Id. at H7098.
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this millennium.m But given that other voices ultimately prevailed, it
remains necessary to test Congress's handiwork against those dispa-
rate approaches.
b. House Commerce Committee
The House Commerce Committee devoted considerable attention
to the perceived dangers in the approach of its sister committee.29 Its
concern was that the basic provision of section 1201, as originally
drafted by the Clinton administration 24 and reported out by the Judi-
ciary Committee,241 would threaten to "lock up"24 works falling within
the scope of its protection.24 Its words are worth quoting at length.
Writing under the heading "Fair Use in the Digital Environment,"
the Report begins by quoting a popular newspaper account of this
seemingly esoteric matter of copyright doctrine.
244
See supra Part I (discussing the Rif).
29 "The Committee on Commerce devoted substantial time and resources to ana-
lyzing the implications of this broad prohibition on the traditional principle of 'fair
use.'" COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 25.
240 The early groundwork for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was laid by the
administration's Information Infrastructure Task Force. See S. Rep. (DMCA), supra
note 36, at 2-3 (discussing the legislative history). This Task Force created a Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights, see id. at 2 (noting the creation of a working
group), which convened the "Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) to explore the par-
ticularly complex issue of fair use in a digital environment and to develop guidelines
for uses of copyrighted works by librarians and educators." Id. at 3. Those efforts,
however, proved inconclusive. See id. at 68 (Additional Views of Sen. Leahy) ("CONFU
has so far been unable to forge a comprehensive agreement on guidelines for the ap-
plication of fair use to digital distance learning.").
241 "[The Commerce] Committee was concerned that H.R. 2281, as reported by
the Committee on the Judiciary, would undermine Congress' long-standing commit-
ment to the principle of fair use." COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 35.
2 The phrase is that of Representatives Klug and Boucher, whose views are
treated below. See infra Part M.C.2.c (discussing their initial disagreement with the
Commerce Committee's report).
243 At that stage of the bill's development, § 1201(a) provided simply that "[n]o
person shall circumvent a technological protection measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under Title 17, United States Code." COMMERCE REP.
(DMCA), supra note 46, at 25. Essentially the same language survived to enact-
ment-but only in the context of a two-year delay and an exception for adversely af-
fected classes. See supra Parts ll.C.2.b, II.C.2.c (discussing the application and effective
date of§ 1201). On the significance of those alterations, see infra Part III.C.4.
" Likewise, a later statement from the Chairman of the Commerce Committee
appends editorials from the New Yor* Times and the Washington Post decrying the spec-
ter of "A Pay-Per-View World." 144 CONG. REC. H7093 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (state-
ment of Rep. Bliley).
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A recent editorial by the Richmond Times-Dispatch succinctly states the
Committee's dilemma:
Copyrights traditionally have permitted public access while pro-
tecting intellectual property. The U.S. approach-known as "fair
use"-benefits consumers and creators. A computer revolution that
has increased access to information also creates opportunities for
the holders of copyrights to impose fees for, among other things,
research and the use of excerpts from published works. And digital
technology-whatever that means-could be exploited to erode fair
use.
The principle of fair use involves a balancing process, whereby the
exclusive interests of copyright owners are balanced against the compet-
ing needs of users of information. This balance is deeply embedded in
the long history of copyright law. On the one hand, copyright law for
centuries has sought to ensure that authors reap the rewards of their ef-
forts and, at the same time, advance human knowledge through educa-
tion and access to society's storehouse of knowledge on the other. This
critical balance is now embodied in Section 106 of the Copyright Act (17
U.S.C. § 106), which grants copyright holders a "bundle" of enumerated
rights, and in Section 107, which codifies the "fair use" doctrine ....
Fair use, thus, provides the basis for many of the most important day-
to-day activities in libraries, as well as in scholarship and education. It
also is critical to advancing the personal interests of consumers. Moreo-
ver, as many testified before the Committee, it is no less vital to Ameri-
can industries, which lead the world in technological innovation. As
more and more industries migrate to electronic commerce, fair use be-
comes critical to promoting a robust electronic marketplace .... 1245]
The Committee was therefore concerned to hear from many private
and public interests that H.R. 2281, as reported by the Committee on the
Judiciary, would undermine Congress' long-standing commitment to the
concept of fair use. A June 4, 1998, letter to the Committee from the
Consumers' Union is representative of the concerns raised by the fair
use community in reaction to H.R. 2281, as reported by the Committee
on the Judiciary. The letter states in part:
These newly-created rights will dramatically diminish public ac-
245 Elsewhere, the Committee concluded, "[tjhroughout our history, the ability of
individual members of the public to access and to use copyrighted materials has been a
vital factor in the advancement of America's economic dynamism, social development,
and educational achievement." COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 35.
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cess to information, reducing the ability of researchers, authors,
critics, scholars, teachers, students, and consumers to find, to quote
for publication and otherwise make fair use of them. It would be
ironic if the great popularization of access to information, which is
the promise of the electronic age, will be short-changed by legisla-
tion that purports to promote this promise, but in reality puts a mo-
nopoly stranglehold on information.
The Committee on Commerce felt compelled to address these risks,
including the risk that enactment of the bill could establish the legal
framework that would inexorably create a "pay-per-use" society. At the
same time, however, the Committee was mindful of the need to honor
the United States' commitment to effectively implement the two WIPO
treaties, as well as the fact that fair use principles certainly should not be
extended beyond their current formulation. The Committee has struck
a balance that is now embodied in Section [1201] (a) (1) of the bill, as
reported by the Committee on Commerce. The Committee has endeav-
ored to specify, with as much clarity as possible, how the right against
anti-circumvention would be qualified to maintain balance between the
interests of content creators and information users. The Committee
considers it particularly important to ensure that the concept of fair use
remains firmly established in the law. Consistent with the United States'
commitment to implement the two WIPO treaties, H.R. 2281, as re-
ported by the Committee on Commerce, fully respects and extends into
the digital environment the bedrock principle of "balance" in American
intellectual property law for the benefit of both copyright owners and
246
users.
As we have seen, legal systems can grapple with these issues
through a variety of means.247 The viewpoint just quoted at length
stands in marked contrast to the property-maximizing view of the Ju-
diciary Committee. The Commerce Committee views public access to
works of authorship as an independent good deserving of legal recog-
nition.2s As such, the House Commerce Committee is heir to the
246 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 25-26 (citations omitted).
247 See supra Part I (confronting the Rifs protocopyright responsum).
248 The Digital Future Coalition addressed the limitations placed on copyright pro-
tection in the interest of "fair use" and promotion of science and the useful arts:
The United States is not a leader in international information commerce de-
spite the balanced character of our traditional copyright law, but because of it.
Indeed, it is the compromise of interests struck in U.S. law... that has en-
abled our country's artistic, scientific, and educational achievements, and pro-
vided the basis for the emergence of our internationally dominant copyright
and high technology industries.
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Rif's rival.249 As we shall see in the unfolding discussion, it is this view
that ultimately held sway in Congress.
c. Dissenting Viewpoint
Although the foregoing excerpt concludes that the Commerce
Committee's alterations achieved balance, two members of the Com-
mittee took exception.5'o Representatives Scott Klug and Rick
Boucher began by disagreeing vehemently with the Judiciary Commit-
tee's draft and then proceeded to note their reservations even with
the Commerce Committee's purportedly balanced formulation:
In its original version, H.R. 2281 contained a provision that would
have made it unlawful to circumvent technological protection measures
that effectively control access to a work, for any reason. In other words,
the bill, if passed unchanged, would have given copyright owners the leg-
islative muscle to "lock up" their works in perpetuity-unless each and
every one of us separately negotiated for access. In short, this provision
converted an unobstructed marketplace that tolerates "free" access in
some circumstances to a "pay-per-access" system, no exceptions permit-
ted.
In our opinion, this not only stands copyright law on its head, it
makes a mockery of our Constitution .... 1251
S. REP. No. 105-25, at 46 (1998) (statement of PeterJazsi, Professor of Law, Washing-
ton College of Law, The American University).
249 Why did the Rif even bother to cite a rival viewpoint, instead of simply pro-
nouncing his own conclusion apodictically? Granted that disagreement is inevitable,
in law as well as in every other human sphere, still it is the majority rule that is bind-
ing-so why should the losing voice even be recorded? That question arises even more
pointedly with respect to the Mishnah, the second century codification of oral Jewish
law. It is "the first canon of its kind known to us, a canon that transmits the tradition
in the form of controversy." HALBERTAL, supra note 18, at 45. It therefore stands in
contrast to normal canonical texts that "select and censor in order to create an
authoritative body out of contending candidates." Id. at 45. Halbertal masterfully
traces the effect that the process of recording dissenting opinions can produce within
the Jewish legal system. See id. at 50-72. Evidently, the Rif was so imbued in the dialec-
tical process of talmudic reasoning spawned by the Mishnah that quoting a rival point
of view just came naturally to him.
Why bother with a dissent? Embroidering on the point raised in the preceding
foomote, a legal system that respects losing viewpoints enough to record them gains
added vitality--a seed from the failed point of view remains dormant, perhaps to
sprout another day or in another place.
21 At this point, the dissenters cite to a portion of the Supreme Court's Sony opin-
ion regarding the constitutionality of limited term for copyright protection. Perhaps
quoting the following comment from the same opinion would have been even more
salient: "[Copyright] protection has never accorded the copyright owner complete
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The anti-circumvention language of H.R. 2281, even as amended,
bootstraps the limited monopoly into a perpetual right. It also funda-
mentally alters the balance that has been carefully struck in 200 years of
copyright case law, by making the private incentive of content owners
the paramount consideration-at the expense of research, scholarship,
education, literary or political commentary, indeed, the future viability
of information in the public domain. In so doing, this legislation goes
well beyond the rights contemplated for copyright owners in the Consti-
tution.
The... amendment, representing a compromise between those on
the content side and "fair use" proponents, simply delays this constitu-
tional problem for a period of two years. Delegating authority to de-
velop anti-circumvention regulations to the Secretary of Commerce
2 5 3
1
was a means to eliminate the stalemate that existed, but it is not, by itself
a comment on the need for limitations on this [sic] anti-circumvention
rights....
What we set out to do was to restore some balance in the discussion
and to place private incentive in its proper context. We had proposed to
do this by legislating an equivalent fair use defense for the new right to
control access. For reasons not clear to us, and despite the WIPO Treaty
language "recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the
rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education,
research and access to information ... " our proposal was met with
strenuous objection. It continued to be criticized even after it had been
redrafted, and extensively tailored, in response to the myriad of piracy
concerns that were raised.2
These sharp criticisms serve as useful tools to evaluate the law that
ultimately emerged.2 5 After reviewing the contours of the final law,2 6
control over all possible uses of his work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984). In the accompanying foomote, the Court cites numerous
instances in which it has rebuffed efforts over the decades that proprietors have made
to extend copyright"in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else." Id. at 432 n.13.
22 See infra Part I.C.4.b (describing in detail the purpose and likely impact of the
"two-year delay").
M As ultimately enacted, regulations are to be promulgated by the Register of
Copyrights, rather than the Secretary of Commerce. See supra note 120 (discussing the
Register of Copyrights's role as rulemaker).
COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 85-86 (additional views of Reps.
Kluland Boucher).
The "dissenters" ended their commentary with these words:
In the end, this legislation purports to protect creators. It may well be that
additional protections are necessary, though we think the 1976 Copyright Act
is sufficiently flexible to deal with changing technology. Whatever protections
Congress grants should not be wielded as a club to thwart consumer demand
for innovative products, consumer demand for access to information, con-
sumer demand for tools to exercise their lawful rights, and consumer expecta-
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the discussion below therefore returns to the points just raised, as well
as to these critics' statements on the House floor.!
7
3. Adoption into Law
a. Explicit Effect on Fair Use
Despite its internal critics, the Commerce Committee's approach
prevailed in the full House of Representatives over the Judiciary
Committee's bill and was ultimately enacted by both chambers.2 The
ultimate bill did not simply contain a basic provision in section 1201
protecting solely the technical processes used by those controlling
content;2 9 instead, Congress adopted that feature in tandem with
corollary features delaying its impact and providing an exception for
262
adversely affected users.2
However, the WIPO Treaties Act does not itself amend the fair use
doctrine 26 as applied to copyright infringement.26 The legislative his-
dons that the people and expertise will exist to service these products.
COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 86-87 (additional views of Reps. Klug and
Boucher).
256 See infra Part III.C.3.a (discussing the final law's explicit effect on fair use).
25 See infra Part III.C.3.b (considering further the arguments of those opposed to
the final law).
25 Notwithstanding that Congress rejected the Commerce Committee's proposal
to take the entire anti-circumvention scheme outside the Copyright Act, the final legis-
lation largely adopts the Commerce Committee's approach. See supra note 103.
29 It would be inaccurate to refer to those in control of content as "copyright own-
ers" (although the terms may overlap in large part) for the former category also in-
cludes those who have secured the technological means to control access to works that
lie outside copyright protection. A low-tech example of that phenomenon would be
one who unearths the sole surviving manuscript of a lost Shakespeare play. See 1
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01 [A] (hypothesizing such a manuscript in a British mu-
seum). Of course, as the cookbook example illustrates, it is almost trivially easy to
transform a public domain work into part of a larger whole that is itself subject to
copyright protection. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21 (suggesting addition
of cogyrightable introduction to public domain cookbooks).
2 See supra Part II.B (detailing the three anti-circumvention provisions in § 1201).
261 See supra Part II.C.2.c (explaining why the circumvention ban does not take ef-
fect until October 28, 2000).
262 See supra Part II.C.2.b (describing the inapplicability of the anti-circumvention
ban to users whose copyrighted work falls "in a particular class of works").
26 In addition, § 1201 contains a provision specifically disclaiming any spillover
onto a traditional fair use defense. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1998). But that
feature is merely negative. The provisions discussed above as to delayed effectiveness
and exceptions for adversely affected users, by contrast, affirmatively import into the
WIPO Treaties Act some solicitude for the fair use interest of those who access works of
authorship. As to how far that solicitude extends, see infra Part III.C.4 (considering
the practical impact of the WIPO Treaties Act).
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tory explains that Congress "determined that no change to section
107 was required because section 107, as written, is technologically
neutral, and therefore, the fair use doctrine is fully applicable in the
digital world as in the analog world."2 5 Instead, vindication of user
interest comes directly in section 1201 itself and in other aspects of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.21 In other words, there is no
such thing as a section 107 fair use defense to a charge of a section
1201 violation; rather, section 1201 itself includes provisions designed
to aid the interests of users.
b. Dissenters'Reconciliation
When the matter later came to its first vote in the full House of
Representatives, Representative Klug-one of the dissenters quoted
above-spoke of the "very difficult balancing act" that led to a "rea-
sonable compromise" in the bill's contours.267 He praised the Com-
merce Committee for having corrected an "automatic transition to a
pay-per-view world by creating an exception for persons having gained
lawful access who are or are likely to be adversely affected by the pro-
hibition.",2 6  Later, when the House-Senate conferees had worked out
their differences, he rose in strong support of the bill,6 specifically
citing "two changes to the bill to instill the balance envisioned by our
constitutional architects and in the long tradition of the Commerce
264 Note that § 1201 deals with something that can be denominated "paracopy-
right," rather than with copyright infringement proper. Seesupra note 66.
265 S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 23-24.
2 See supra Part I.A (discussing the attempt to balance the interests of copyright
owners with those of users).
267 144 CONG. REc. H7100 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug).
263 Id. That characterization is inaccurate. The parties that are adversely affected
need not have obtained lawful access. See supra Part ll.C.2.b. Conversely, parties who
have obtained lawful access can make any fair use of the subject work, even if not ad-
versely affected by the prohibition. See supra Part Il.C.2.
In his next sentence, Representative Klug stated, "In interpreting 'lawful access,' it
is my hope that this term is broadly construed to include students at a university, pa-
trons in a library, and investigative journalists who obtain critical information, among
others." 144 CONG. REc. H7100. If the WIPO Treaties Act actually did allow students
and journalists to disable technological protections to gain access to works, then its
breathing space for fair use would be far more expansive than that of the actual § 1201
as enacted, as the discussion below demonstrates. See infra Part III.C.4.a (considering
hypothetical cases of uses of copyrightable material and the application of § 1201 in
these situations).
269 144 CONG. REC. H10621 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug)
(lauding the bill's "thoughtful, balanced manner that promotes product development
and information usage" and urging his "colleagues to vote for this legislation").
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Committee. ,270 The first is its incorporation of "the strong fair use
provision the Commerce Committee crafted, for the benefit of librar-
ies, universities, and consumers generally."27 1 The second is the "no
mandate" provision,2 7 a portion of the law which "clarifies that noth-
ing in section 1201 creates a mandate requiring manufacturers of
consumer electronics, telecommunications, and computing products
to design their products or their parts and components to respond to
any particular technological measure employed to protect a copy-
righted work."27 It bears mentioning that those cited features all
formed part of the bill as initially reported out by the Commerce
Committee274 at a time when Representative Klug was in the role of
dissenter.7
Representative Boucher, the other initial dissenter, likewise rose
to support passage of the bill, 27 6 which he characterized as a "balanced
result' ensuring "that traditional user rights are not undermined."
2 7 7
An ally offered more explanation in his remarks. Representative
Stearns elaborated that he and Representative Boucher agreed to
withdraw their earlier amendment in order to push the bill forward,
in exchange for language in the Commerce Committee report that
"expanded on the proper definition of a 'technological protection
270 I.
271. The reference to libraries and universities is presumably to the exemption
enjoyed by those entities. See H. REP. (DMCA), supra note 63, at 4 (containing section
entitled "Exemption for Nonprofit Libraries, Archives, and Educational Institutions").
See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (outlining the exemption granted to
nonrofit libraries).
144 CONG. REC. H10621 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Klug).
273 S. REP. (DMCA), supra note 36, at 30. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.05 [C]
(discussing the "no mandate" provision). Note, however, that a separate portion of the
law emphatically abandons the "no mandate" approach with respect to consumer ana-
log videotape recorders. See i& at § 12A.06 (noting copy control technological re-
quirements for certain analog videocassette recorders).
274 See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 3-4 (containing the fair use and
no mandate provisions).
275 See supra Part llI.C.2.c (detailing objections to the Commerce Committee's re-
port on H.R. 2281). Moreover, those two features appear far afield from the concerns
over user rights with which the discussion above grapples.
276 See 144 CONG. REc. H7096 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Boucher).
277 Id. Commenting on the Conference Report, Representative Boucher stated
that "the legislation is not intended to diminish core fair use and other rights that have
always been recognized in our copyright law." 144 CONG. REc. E2166 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Boucher). A long letter from Howard Coble, the Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, defining some of the terminology used in
the statute, is appended to Representative Boucher's statement. See 144 CONG. EC.
H7096-H7098 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Boucher).
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measure.' 278 How that definition safeguards user rights remains un-
specified.279
By the time the WIPO Treaties Act was enacted, solicitude for fair
use in the digital environment exceeded support for mother's apple
pie, 2' and "the specter of moving our Nation towards a 'pay-per-use'
society"21 had become as popular in Congress as the Mafia drug
trade.2 2 Not a single speaker in either the House or the Senate rose
to express any other point of view.2  Instead, the Rema's compromise
278 144 CONG. REc. H7101 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Steams).
27 Representative Steams later stressed that "those measures covered by the bill
are those based upon encryption, scrambling, authentication and some other measure
which requires the use of, quote, a key provided by a copyright holder." 144 CONG.
REC. H10618 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Steams). See COMMERCE REP.
(DMCA), supra note 46, at 39 ("[M]easures that can be deemed to 'effectively control
access to a work' would be those based on encryption, scrambling, authentication, or
some other measure which requires the use of a 'key' provided by a copyright owner to
gain access to a work.")
280 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. E1640 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep.
Tauzin) ("A free market place for ideas is critical to America. It means that any man,
woman or child--free of chargell-can wander into any public library and use the ma-
terials in those libraries for free."); 144 CONG. REc. H7102 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998)
(remarks of Rep. Hastert) (emphasizing that digitized products "should not hinder a
child's learning... or complicate an academic's research... or prevent a high-tech
engineer in Illinois from improving innovative products"); 144 CONG. REC. H7093
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Bliley) (stressing that a strong fair use provi-
sion was included "to ensure that consumers as well as libraries and institutions of
higher learning will be able to continue to exercise their historical fair use rights").
281 144 CONG. REC. S11887 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Ashcroft).
282 As Representative Dingell has noted:
As copyrighted works are afforded more protection, they will be encrypted in
"digital wrappers" that make them impenetrable to anyone other than those
who are willing to pay the going rate. While that may sound like the Ameri-
can way, it is not. United States copyright law historically has carved out im-
portant exceptions to the rights of copyright owners.
144 CONG. REc. H7099 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Dingell); see also, e.g.,
144 CONG. REC. H7101 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Steams) (noting the
inclusion of language to "protect consumers from a 'pay-per-view' world in the digital
area"); 144 CONG. REc. E2144 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Tauzin) (de-
scribing pay-per-view as "profoundly antithetical to our long tradition of the exchange
of free ideas and information").
283 Even during deliberations on the bill, the hearings contain universal support
for maintaining a robust fair use defense, even from witnesses on the "content side" as
opposed to the "user side." For instance, in response to one of Representative Lof-
gren's frequent questions about how fair use would be safeguarded on the Internet,
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214reigned supreme, and the lawmaking body crafted rules to intervene
and remedy the lack of availability of a given class of works, such as the
physics textbooks and baroque concerti invoked earlier.2",
Whether as a matter of conviction or acknowledgment of political
reality, at the end of the day no one remained opposed to the entireDigital • 286
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, including the provision just men-
tioned safeguarding user access to restricted works.28 Analysis of the
legal impact of this provision, however, must proceed from reason
rather than an appeal to authority on either side of the divide.28
4. Analysis
With the adoption of the Commerce Committee's approach, both
praised as balanced and derided as inadequate, a question arises as to
how well section 1201 safeguards fair use and whether it successfully
avoids the universally decried risk of a pay-per-use world. Based on
the above analysis of section 1201, we can now gauge the practical im-
pact of the WIPO Treaties Act.
one witness supporting the Act testified that "my association is totally committed to
and in favor of the doctrine of fair use." 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at
235 (statement of Michael Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property
Law Association). See id. at 47 ("The challenge is how to [provide] ... protection to
copyright owners, while avoiding chilling... lawful uses of copyrighted works and pub-
lic domain materials.") (statement of Register of Copyrights Peters); id. at 229 (sug-
gesting that legislation should be amended to add to § 1201(a) "without the authority
of the copyright owner or in a manner that constituted fair use') (statement of Rep.
Frank) (emphasis added).
284 See supra Part I (describing the Rema's authorization for a lawmaking body to
intervene to provide unavailable works).
285 See supra Part II.C.2.b (positing restricted access to those categories).
286 See Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Pro-
posed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909Act, 36J. COPYRIGHT. Soc'Y 109, 111 (1989) (stat-
ing that "[c]hanges in the Copyright Act have almost always been enacted with the
consent of all 'respectable' interest groups that would be affected by the change"). In
sharp contrast, the previous day Congress passed a separate amendment to the Copy-
right Act over bitter opposition. Various legislators rose to call the Fairness In Music
Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, Sec. 201 (Oct. 27, 1998), an
"outrageous" and "bitter pill to swallow," 144 CONG. REc. 512434 (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1998) (remarks of Sen. Thompson), a "shortsighted policy" and "an unconstitutional
taking," 144 CONG. RFC. E2089 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Scarbor-
ough), as well as "hypocritical," 144 CONG. REC. E2070 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1998) (re-
marks of Rep. Gordon).
287 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the user exemption of§ 1201).
288 Just because the dissenters initially criticized the majority approach does not by
itself render their criticism valid. Conversely, just because they may have ultimately
altered their stance does not itself undermine the validity of their previous criticism.
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a. Case Studies
Let us revert to the public domain cookbook or sound record-
ing28 that has been combined with a new introduction or other mate-
rial subject to copyright and brought under a technological protection
measure.m As of the year 2005, those works could be virtually un-
available through low-tech means yet accessible to those who have
paid for the appropriate decryption algorithm or password. In such a
world, let us further imagine that Alice hacks her way in, gaining ac-
cess to the work to avoid paying the license fee associated with taking
out an authorized password. Bob does the same but instead to deter-
mine if he likes the old jazz song enough to pay the freight for regular
access to it. Carol is writing her Ph.D. dissertation on obscure diction
and wants to quote archaisms and franglais from the mouths of Creole
chefs, which she remembers (from browsing a copy of the book long
ago at a second-hand shop) are contained in the cookbook. Finally,
Ted is a software virtuoso who boasts that he "can pick any lock." 1'
How does their conduct stack up?
Alice is the quintessential violator--hers is the precise conduct
against which the basic provision is aimed.23 Accordingly, there is no
question that her circumvention of a technological measure that ef-
fectively controls access to a work protected by a subsisting U.S. copy-
right places her in violation of the statute.2 4 Can she nevertheless
take refuge in the fact that the publisher is actually charging for a
work in the public domain rather than one protected by copyright?
Inasmuch as the publisher has implemented a password scheme that
prevents unauthorized access to its works, which themselves are sub-
28 See supra Part II.C.1 (using examples of cookbooks and old music recordings to
illustrate conversion of public domain works into copyrightable derivative works, and
hence potentially royalty-generating items).
M See supra Part U.B (describing the technological protection measures).
291 See ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? 90 (1994) ("[F]or
every technological lock placed within the work product, there will be a pirate lock-
smith ready and willing to break in ... merely for thejoy of accomplishment.").
Note that the terminology here is not "infringer," inasmuch as § 1201 does not
safeguard copyright so much as something that can be termed "paracopyright." See
COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 24 (stating that the provisions are con-
cerned with "paracopyright"); supra note 66 (same).
29 See supra Part II.B (laying out the basic provision and other anti-circumvention
features).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1998) ("No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
tide.").
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ject to copyright by virtue of the new additions,' 5 that argument is un-
availing. Although Alice would not run afoul of section 1201 by hack-
ing her way into a domain containing no copyrightable elements, the
domain to which she in fact gained unauthorized entry does contain
copyrighted elements--notwithstanding that the particular compo-
nents that she ultimately wished to enjoy lie outside copyright protec-
tion. Given that the language of the statute is absolute2g6 -"[n]o per-
son shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title' L- Alice is culpable for the
anti-circumvention violation.
What about Bob? Many publishers release shareware, which cus-
tomers can "try on for size" during a test period . Shareware pub-
lishers do not fall within the framework of the anti-circumvention ba-
sic provision and its coordinate trafficking offense; instead, they fall
under the "additional violations."2 In that context, there is no coun-
terpart basic offense to dovetail with the additional violations, so Bob's
conduct would be nonactionable against a shareware publisher.Y In
effect, Bob has elected to treat the subject music as shareware; an
honorable listener, he has an unblemished track record of paying for
all recordings that he actually adds to his collection.
Ultimately, however, Bob too falls on the wrong side of the tracks
laid by section 1201. Although publishers are free to adopt the share-
ware paradigm, they are not obligated to do so. Bob cannot unilater-
ally pigeonhole purveyors of works into a category from which they
have absented themselves--to make proprietary publishers into
shareware publishers. Bob has no right to browse the access-protected
works to determine if he wants to buy them. Section 1201 grants such
2 See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (describing how the addition of a
small amount of original material to works that have fallen into the public domain al-
lows the publisher to claim a copyright in the whole work).
See supra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of how Congress adopted essentially the
same language from the House Judiciary Committee bill that the House Commerce
Committee found so unbalanced.
2 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (A).
298 On "shareware," see 2 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 7.25 n. 11 ("Unfortunately, the
term is undefined in the current act and is susceptible of different meanings in the
computer and legal communities." (internal citation and quotation omitted)). On
potential strategies in the future for the distribution of software via subscriptions, see I.
TROTTER HARDY, PROJECT LOOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT
IN A NETWORKED WORLD-FINAL REPORT 108-12 (1998).
29 See supra Part II.B (distinguishing the three separate types of anti-circumvention
violations contained in § 1201).
See supra Part II.B.3 (stating that a person who has lawful access to a work does
not violate any provision of § 1201 by engaging in prohibited usage of the work).
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browsing rights only to qualifying libraries and archives, not to indi-
viduals such as Bob."°"
Bob, like Alice, cannot take refuge in the fact that the recordings
themselves reside in the public domain, for the language of the stat-
ute is such that Bob runs afoul of it.s°2 Given that the subject record-
ings are contained in a file that contains the copyrighted commentary
of a renowned musicologist, that the file as a whole is protected by a
technological measure that effectively controls access to it, and that
Bob hacked his way into that file, all the elements for a section 1201
violation are present-again, notwithstanding that the particular
components that Bob ultimately wished to enjoy lie outside copyright
protection.
The examples of Alice and Bob seem to bear out the dissenters'
initial criticism30 3 that "[tihe anti-circumvention language of H.R.
2281, even as amended, bootstraps the limited monopoly into a per-
petual right." °4 To be sure, that bootstrapping is far from inevita-
ble--it comes to bear only in a world in which the sole effective means
of access to the subject cookbook and recording is through the en-
crypted methodology posited above. Hopefully, that state of affairs
would never come to pass-just as one entity was able to obtain a copy
of the subject works in order to upload them, so others should be able
to do the same. The latter, moreover, can offer those works free of
charges 5 Therefore, it might be that the first publisher's efforts at
301 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (5) (granting an exemption from § 1201 to libraries and
archives whose collections are either open to the public, or available to not only affili-
ated researchers, but also to "other persons doing research in a specialized field");see 3
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.04[A] [2] ("In order for an institution to qualify for this
exemption, it must be a 'nonprofit library, archives or educational institution.'" (quot-
ing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (1))).
302 For Bob to interpose such a defense, the statute would have to read, contrary to
fact, "[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected by this tide except for thepurpose of accessing uncopyrighted mate-
riaL" See also 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at 229 (containing alternative
language that Rep. Frank mused Congress could have drafted).
See supra Part mI.C.2.c (stating that the statute would give copyright owners the
ability "to 'lock up' their works in perpetuity").
CoMMERc REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 85 (Additional Views of Representa-
tives Klug and Boucher). In United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Pub-
lishers, 902 F. Supp. 411, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), a party challenged ASCAP's definition of
"program subject to fee" that included material that was not subject to copyright pro-
tection. The court invalidated that construction under ASCAP's consent decree. Par-
allel logic would conclude that material subject to regulation under the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act does not include material for which no license is required because
it is no longer subject to copyright protection.
305 Neither party had to undertake the cost of creating the underlying works, so
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constructing its own domaine public payan?06 will be doomed to failure.
The point, however, is that the structure of section 1201, despite prot-
estations to the contrary,30 7 does not categorically negate this baleful
possibility-unless through the exception for adversely affected us-
ers,308 to which the discussion turns below.
Before reaching those points, however, consider Carol and Ted.
Not only is Carol (the Ph.D. candidate) using a public domain
work-a circumstance that, as observed in the cases of Alice and Bob,
affords only cold comfort-but even such isolated quotation as she is
drawing from the work, were it copyrighted, would itself find shelter
under the fair use umbrella'0 9 Does section 1201 catch even her in its
net? It does. For regardless of how lofty her purpose might be, she
has violated the elements of the statute. Although, as noted in the
discussion of Bob, section 1201 contains no prohibition on disabling
technological measures once access to a work has been lawfully
gained, as the Commerce Committee dissenters specifically com-
there is little reason why a second comer cannot simply ignore the "value-added" in-
troduction of the first party (which caused copyright protection to attach in the first
instance) and offer the public domain work at a lower price-or for nothing.
S0 SeeJanusz Barta & Ryszard Markiewicz, Poland, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE § 3[2] [c] (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1999) ("[P]roducers of copies of literary and musical works, works of the
fine arts, [and] photographic and cartographic works... published in Polish territory
and... the public domain.., must transmit to the Fund for the Promotion of Creativ-
ity [a] percent of their gross receipts arising from... these works .... "); Miguel A.
Emery, Argentina, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACtiCE, supra § 4[3] [d]
("[Plarties engaging in the publication, reproduction, or diffusion in Argentina of
works fallen into the public domain [must] pay a contribution to the National Fund of
the Arts."); Mihily Ficsor, Hungay, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACrIcnE, supra, § 4[3] [f] ("'After the expiration of the protection of the author's
economic rights, a charge shall be paid in cases specified by statutory provi-
sions.'... Resulting payments are collected by an organization appointed by the Minis-
ter ofJustice .... ").
so7See supra Part II.C.2 (referring to the "fail-safe" mechanism).
308 See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the circumstances in which Congress will allow
the anti-circumvention provisions to be selectively waived so as to prevent the unjustifi-
able diminution of access to copyrighted materials for lawful purposes). Note that the
statute also contains a safeguard for users by delaying the effective date of the basic
provision for two years. See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 37 (stating that
the primary reason for the delay is to develop a record as to how the implementation
of new technologies affects the availability of works for lawful uses). Inasmuch as Al-
ice's and Bob's conduct is posited to occur as of the year 2005, however, that grace pe-
riod has long since passed.
The fair use provision singles out for special consideration "purposes such
as... teaching [and] scholarship." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). See also Sundeman v. Sea-
jay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding a scholarly appraisal
"from a biographical and literary perspective" to be fair use).
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plained, their effort at "legislating an equivalent fair use defense for
the new right to control access" was rejected "for reasons not clear to
us."
310
But why does the fair use doctrine itself not come to Carol's res-
cue? Even though Congress did not add to section 1201 a specific fair
use proviso that covers Carol, it at least left the existing provision un-
disturbed3" Given that Carol's activities fall quintessentially within
the protection of that defense, why is it inadequate to doom any cause
of action against her? The answer lies in how the Copyright Act is
structured. On the one hand, the Act forbids copyright infringe-
ment1 2 subject to a fair use defense.3 1 3 On the other hand, the WIPO
Treaties Act adds a wholly separate tort of unauthorized circumven-
tion,a to which the fair use defense is inapplicable.315
The upshot is that Carol, too, having circumvented a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected by U.S.
copyright,316 falls afoul of section 1201. From a traditional copyright
310 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), sup ra note 46, at 86 (Additional Views of Representa-
tives Kiug and Boucher).
31SU1 supra Part III.C.3.a (discussing the effectof§ 1201 on fair use).
12 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (granting the copyright owner
the exclusive right to reproduce, prepare derivative works based upon, distribute cop-
ies of, perform, or display the copyrighted work, and authorizing the owner to institute
an action for an infringement of these rights).
ss 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("[Tlhe fair use of copyrighted work... is not an infringement
of copyright.").
For that reason, the legislative history refers to it as "paracopyright." See supra
note 66.
s15 See supra Part mII.C.S.a ("There is no such thing as a section 107 fair use defense
to a charge of a section 1201 violation."). Given that the hearings for the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act contain endless complaints about this state of affairs, it scarcely
can have arisen by oversight. Consider the following representative extract:
By focusing on the technological act of circumvention in and of itself, as op-
posed to copyright infringement, the Administration bill creates a number of
problems, among them the significant diminution of fair use. It is entirely
possible that circumvention of a protection measure would enable fair use of
the work. However, fair use is only relevant as a limitation on liability for in-
fringement. If the new legislation does not use copyright infringement as the
criterion for violation of the copyright act, then fair use is not a limitation on
liability.
1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at 260 (statement of Edward J. Black, Presi-
dent, Computer and Communications Industry Association).
316 As previously noted in the context of both Alice and Bob, it is no help to Carol's
defense that she was only seeking to obtain ultimate access to works in the public do-
main. In order to arrive at her goal, she disabled protection that excluded the public
from access to the introduction to the 1875 cookbook, which was written in 1999 and
therefore subject to copyright protection.
2000]
732 UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVfEW [Vol. 148:673
standpoint, the purportedly "fair" character of her utilization affords
no defense to a charge that she is culpable of a new anti-
circumvention violation.
At last reaching Ted (the hacker), to the extent that he advertises
his abilities to or performs services for Alice, Bob, or Carol, he would
thereby be aiding individuals who themselves fall afoul of section
1201. As such, he would be culpable of a trafficking violation.
317
As noted above, the House Commerce Committee, in order to
balance user interests against owner interests, added two features to
section 1201 that were lacking from the Judiciary Committee bill.1 8
One of these features delays the application of the basic provision for
two years.3 1 9 The other creates exceptions for the benefit of adversely
affected users.32 If relief is to be found from the perpetual "lock up"
of public domain works, its locus must lie in these two additions.
b. Two-Year Delay
As to the time limit, it offers no aid past 2000. As the dissenters
commented, it "simply delays this constitutional problem for a period
of two years."3 2' Given the hypothetical posture above, in which Alice,
Bob, and Carol were acting in 2005, this feature offers no safeguard to
their interests.
Nonetheless, it is still instructive to inquire how far the grace pe-
riod goes in protecting user interests. Let us imagine that David wants
access in 1999 to the same ancient recording posited above, and, fur-
ther, that it is packaged with a musicologist's recent commentary. Be-
cause the basic provision is inapplicable during this time period, he
can hack into the system to his heart's content without violating sec-
317 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1998) (setting out the provisions of the
trafficking ban). See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text (describing the traffick-
ing ban).
318 See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (discussing fair use principles in
the creation of this balance).
319 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (detailing the basic provision's effec-
tive date).
320 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (clarifying the class of persons to
which the bar does not apply).
321 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 85-86 (Additional Views of Repre-
sentatives Klug and Boucher). For additional context, see supra notes 250-54 and ac-
companying text, which excerpt the dissenters' comments.
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Positing further, however, that the gregarious David knows the
music he likes but lacks the technical wherewithal to access it, he must
hire the withdrawn but brilliant Lisa to disable the encryption in
which the music is currently wrapped. Imagine further that Lisa
manufactures a device called JazzExtract that can indeed pluck out of
its secure envelope the music that David wants; without the machine,
however, the music lies beyond David's grasp.
Selling a device falls within the statute's trafficking ban rather
than the basic provision."2 That trafficking ban is not subject to a two-
year delay; rather, it takes effect immediately5 4 As a consequence,
David cannot buy in 1999 the device that allows him to exercise the
rights he possesses in 1999.s2
Does this statutory scheme make sense? As previously noted, the
reason for the two-year delay in the basic provision "is to allow the de-
velopment of a sufficient record as to how the implementation of
these technologies is affecting availability of works in the marketplace
for lawful uses."126 Even before the game begins, however, users such
as David, who lack technical expertise, are effectively checkmated.
As a result, section 1201 produces a most curious state of affairs.
It safeguards various rights to users but simultaneously bars third par-
ties from assisting them to take advantage of those safeguarded
rights.32 7 Although the WIPO Treaties Act forms an outgrowth of the
32 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (establishing the date the ban
takes effect).
32 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that the targets of the traffick-
ing ban are those who facilitate the hacking process).
324 See supra note 133 (noting the lack of any language delaying the provision's ef-
fective date).
325 Larry Lessig's insights help unravel some of the multiple levels at issue here.
The code that regulates Lisa, stopping her from helping David, is Title 17 of the
United States Code, in which § 1201 is codified. By contrast, the code that regulates
David-who is under no comparable legal disability-forestalling him from obtaining
the music he wants, is the computer encoding that encrypts that music or otherwise
places it beyond his grasp. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWvS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999).
326 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 37. See supra notes 134-35 and ac-
companying text (discussing the purpose of the delay).
What if, in place of David, Goliath Inc. occupies this position? Presumably, if
employee P needs access to a given work, and if employee Q is assigned to circumvent
technological measures in order to help P, then both of their activities are imputed to
their principal, and there is no liability in this instance. See COMMERCE REP. (DMCA),
supra note 46, at 43 (evincing sensitivities to "small software developers who do not
have the capability of performing these functions in-house," thus implying that big
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law governing related defendants,s28 that amendment stands on its
head5 2 the proposition that related defendants cannot be liable for
the offenses of others unless those others have actually committed an
offenses3"
c. Statutory Exception for Users
The two-year delay thus cannot serve as the basis for justifying the
Commerce Committee's claim that it has achieved balance, as applied
to such cases as those of Alice, Bob, and Carol. More promising,
though, is the exemption for adversely affected users of particular
copyrighted works. Although the basis for this exception has already
been discussed,ssl it is worth reiterating the House Commerce Com-
mittee's own rationale:
[T]he Committee is concerned that marketplace realities may someday
dictate a different outcome, resulting in less access, rather than more, to
copyrighted materials that are important to education, scholarship, and
other socially vital endeavors. This result could flow from a confluence
of factors, including the elimination of print or other hard-copy versions,
the permanent encryption of all electronic copies, and the adoption of
business models that depend upon restricting distribution and availabil-
ity, rather than upon maximizing it. In this scenario, it could be appro-
priate to modify the flat prohibition against the circumvention of effec-
software developers would be able to rely on their employees to perform the subject
tasks).
328 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12A.01 [A) (delineating liability for "related de-
fendants").
32 Do any facets of pre-existing law resemble this outcome? One case forbade the
making of off-the-air videotapes for commercial purposes on behalf of clients who
themselves would be privileged to do so acting in a private capacity. SeePacific & S. Co.
v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[A] commercial purpose makes
copying onto a videotape cassette presumptively unfair." (quotations omitted)). But
the reason for the discrepancy in Duncan is that the client's taping is saved from liabil-
ity only because it is noncommercial, whereas the commercial taping is undertaken for
pecuniary gain, and is liable on that basis. Here, by contrast, David's activity is nonin-
fringing even if undertaken for commercial purposes because it falls into a statutory
safe harbor. Yet Lisa cannot even give him gratis a device to help him attain his legiti-
mate goal.
330 See 3 NIMMEp, supra note 4, § 12.04[A] [3] [a] (explaining that a direct in-
fringement must exist for there to be third-party liability). Note, however, that some
disagree with this proposition. See HARDY, supra note 298, at 181 n.200 (collecting
authorities questioning the position that a direct violation is required for a contribu-
tory violation).
331 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (considering the importance of
continued marketplace access to scholarly and socially vital materials that motivated
Congress to include the exemption).
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tive technological measures that control access to copyrighted materials,
in order to ensure that access for lawful purposes is not unjustifiably di-
minished.s
32
As previously noted, the dissenters maintained that this feature did
not go far enough in safeguarding user interestssss
Let us now add Harry and Sally to our cast of characters. Harry
capitalizes on the statute's adverse effect on individuals such as Bob
and Carol. He demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Register of
Copyrights that nineteenth-century cookbooks and vintage 1920s jazz
recordings have been locked up with new copyrightable additions in
digitally wrapped envelopes and are effectively unavailable for brows-
ing and fair use quotation. As a consequence of Harry's proof, regula-
tions emerge exempting those two categories of particular works from
the anti-circumvention ban. Harry is now free to hack into those
works; the content owners whose technological measures are thereby
circumvented remain powerless to object.
To this extent, the statute contains the safeguards for fair use that
the Commerce Committee desired. As enacted, the WIPO Treaties
Act therefore mollifies some of the concerns over fair use at which the
committee aimed.5 3
Now imagine that Harry is himself a chef or musician who (like
David confronted above) lacks the expertise to personally effectuate
the access to which he is legally entitled. Sally is a whiz who can help
him. Unlike Ted, who was hired to aid people to accomplish what
section 1201 forbids, Sally is to be hired to aid someone who has every
right under section 1201 to circumvent the technological protections
in order to obtain access. It would seem, therefore, that her conduct
should not only be exempt under the statute, but that it should be
2 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 36.
See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text (quoting Representatives Klug
and Boucher's critique of the purported balance maintained in the legislation).
What if the feared "lock up" of works occurs not merely with cookbooks and
jazz recordings, but across the board as to all works? In that event, the evil against
which this exception is aimed would be at its most severe. Ironically, however, the Reg-
ister of Copyrights would be powerless to act, inasmuch as the authority to issue regula-
tions applies only as to "a particular class of works." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (B) (Supp.
IV 1998). In such a catastrophic event, however, hopefully new congressional interven-
tion would be soon forthcoming. As one witness commented, "this Congress doesn't
go away and this committee does not go away" even after the legislation is passed. See
The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. of Commerce, 105th Cong.
86 (1998) (testimony of George Vradenburg III, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, America Online, Inc.).
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positively applauded-for it is necessary to vindicate the statute's poli-
cies, with respect to all but the most technically sophisticated users of
copyrighted materials.
Nonetheless, the statute as drafted bars Sally from aiding Harry
because the user exemption applies solely to the basic provision and
not to the coordinate trafficking ban.335  Sally's conduct in aid of
Harry would seem to violate each of the three particulars of that latter
ban, and thus to be triply barred. In particular, it
(1)is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumvent-
ing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [U.S. copyright law];
(2)has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls ac-
cess to a work protected under [U.S. copyright law]; or
(3) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
[U.S. copyright law].336
The problem in the statutory drafting is that none of the features
quoted above contains an exception for a particular class of works to
which consumers are denied access. Harry needs access to a work that
is locked up; for that reason, Congress included a specific exemption
to the basic provision of the three anti-circumvention bans. The only
methodology that would afford Harry that right (short of putting him
through years of schooling to develop his hacking skills up to world-
class standards) is defined by the statute as trafficking. Unfortunately,
Congress failed to include any complementary exemption to the traf-
ficking ban in order to protect the likes of Harry! Because Harry
WS See supra Parts II.C.2.b, III.C.2.c (discussing the application of the user exemp-
tion and the delayed effective date of the circumvention ban, inapplicable to the traf-
ficking ban).
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2). One wimess urged Congress to solve problems arising
out of regulating behavior rather than technology, see supra Part II.A (discussing the
DMCA's focus on actions taken by people as opposed to technology), by adding 12
words to the preamble for the trafficking ban: "For the purpose of facilitating or en-
gaging in an act of infringement." 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at 250
(statement of Christopher Byrne, Director of Intellectual Property, Silicon Graphics).
As Byrne elaborated, "[w]e don't want black boxes out there that are only designed to
steal intellectual property. When we cast that net, let's catch the tuna, but let's not
drown the dolphins." Id. Ignoring that plea, Congress declined to adopt the proposed
preamble (or another equivalent formula), thereby ensnaring Sally and fellow cetace-
ans.
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needs help precisely "for the purpose of circumventing a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
[U.S. copyright law]," 3 7 the peculiar upshot is that Sally would fall
afoul of the ban on trafficking by helping Harry to act exactly within
the scope of the user exemption.
Part of this state of affairs is eminently understandable. The need
for balance here is, on the one hand, for the likes of Carol, David, and
Harry who want access to a discrete category of works, and on the
other hand, to proprietors who want to protect the vast bulk of works
that may legitimately remain under lock and key. If a black box can
lawfully be put on the market because it serves the narrow interests of
Carol, David, and Harry that the law protects, then it can be sold to
anyone. At that point, the exception threatens to swallow the rule,
and the elaborate structure of section 1201 could be rendered nuga-
tory.
Nonetheless, the trafficking ban reaches too far to serve its stated
purpose. Returning to ourJazzExtract device, whose only purpose is
to unlock 1920 recordings, there would be no need to suppress that
particular machine, as consumers could not use it for a prohibited
purpose.*a 8 More pointedly, if Harry hires Sally not to develop a ma-
chine that could be used generally for the nefarious goal of disabling
general protections, but solely to hack into a digitally wrapped file en-
titled Scott.Joplin.Recordings-pursuant to regulations that specifi-
cally authorize him to do so-then there is no reason at all to bar that
conduct. To the contrary, Sally's conduct vindicates the lengthy
mechanism inserted into the statute in order to protect adversely af-
fected users. 39 Further, the narrow focus of Sally's hacking means
that, by definition, it cannot be subverted in the hands of third parties
to defeat legitimate rights. In short, the reach of the trafficking ban is
unjustifiably broad; Congress should have reconciled the trafficking
ban with the exemptions that it placed on the basic provision.3 '
3 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (A).
333 One witness claimed that the Commerce Department considered "a provision
that would have provided a fair use exemption for devices that were limited to fair use
uses, and, basically, they came to the conclusion that, kind of, too cute by half, because
there isn't such a technology that exists." 1997 Hearings, Serial No. 33, supra note 90, at
231 (testimony of Hilary Rosen).
339 See supra Part ll.C.2.b (discussing the extent to which adversely affected indi-
viduals qualify for exemption from the anti-circumvention provision).
30 The same problem afflicts the library exemption. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, at
§ 12A.04[A] [1] (explaining the scope of the library exemption). Although qualifying
libraries are privileged to browse works without authorization under applicable condi-
tions, their retention of Sally to facilitate the process places her in violation of the traf-
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By contrast to how Congress half-heartedly legislated protection to
user interests in section 1201, consider how Congress actually followed
through to reconcile the various anti-circumvention bans with respect
to other interests safeguarded by section 1201. For instance, the stat-
ute creates an exception from the basic provision for the purpose of
engaging in encryption research3 41 Standing alone, that safe harbor
would be as feckless as the one protecting Harry. For the erstwhile re-
searcher would only be allowed to act on his own, without benefit of
help from others, such as Sally. For that reason, Congress also in-
serted into the statute a parallel exception from the trafficking ban for
the purpose of facilitating encryption research.342 The self-conscious
goal of that latter addition was to permit "a person to provide such
technological means to another person with whom the first person is
collaborating.
'"4
The same dynamic applies to the exception safeguarding reverse
engineering; Congress recognized in that context "that, in certain
instances, it is possible that a person may need to develop special tools
to achieve the permitted purpose of interoperability." The contrast
is striking between fully protected arenas, such as encryption and re-
verse engineering, 46 and the user exemption invoked by Harry and
Sally, which is not excepted from the trafficking ban as it is from the
ficking ban. Nonetheless, if a qualifying library assigns one of its own staff members to
the job instead of hiring Sally, the conduct probably stands beyond reproach. See supra
note 327 and accompanying text (comparing the protection available to an employee
to the lack of such protection for a third party).
341 See supra Part Il.D.1 (stating that encryption is exempted from the basic anti-
circumvention provision).
342 See supra Part II.D.1 (stating that encryption is exempted from the ban on traf-
ficking).
COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 44.
Section 1201 contains an exemption from the basic provision to engage in re-
verse engineering. See supra Part lI.D.1. It separately sets forth a complementary ex-
emption from the trafficking ban, to facilitate that first species of conduct. See supra
Part II.D.1.
34 COMMERCE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 43. "The ability to rely on third par-
ties is particularly important for small software developers who do not have the capabil-
ity of performing these functions in-house. This provision permits such sharing of in-
formation and tools." Md That language would appear equally applicable to the
Harrs and Sallys of the world.
The same dynamic applies as well to security testing, which likewise incorpo-
rates a trafficking exemption to complement the exemption from the basic provision.
See supra Part II.D.1.
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basic provision. Congress, in short, neglected to furnish the same
measure of protection to adversely affected users as it did to other
categories of users to whom it wished to show solicitude.
By the same token, Congress failed to adopt in this context the
safeguards that it incorporated into other portions of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act. Instead of restricting liability to those who
induce or collude with bad actors, as it did in the Vessel Hull Design
Protection Actm7 Congress defined the trafficking aspect of section
1201 to reach the Sallys and Lisas of the world, along with the Teds.
Instead of acknowledging that the anti-circumvention reach of section
1201 called forth the need for self-help among those whose rights
elsewhere in the Copyright Act would otherwise be overborne, as it
did in adjusting the ephemeral recordings exemption u8 Congress de-
liberately failed to incorporate a fair use exemption here. The result
of these juxtapositions seems to be a conscious contraction of user
rights.
WRAP-UP
Congress enacted section 1201 based on its perception that "the
digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright
owners."349 Even if that threat is unique, however, it scarcely arises in a
vacuum."" The tension between property rights and user-access rights
does not loom from the approaching digital millennium; it has been a
ceaseless part of the millennium now ending.35
The lengthy analysis of how section 1201 works in practice leads to
the conclusion that its entire edifice of user exemptions is of doubtful
puissance. The user safeguards so proudly heralded as securing bal-
ance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to
achieve their stated goals. If the courts apply section 1201 as written,
47 See supra Part M.B.2 (discussing the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act and its
provisions limiting liability as to sellers and distributors).
34 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (explaining that, although the
Act does not provide a right of action against a copyright owner who fails to make
available the necessary means for making a copy of an ephemeral recording, it does
afford self-help by shielding a user from liability for an anti-circumvention violation in
that context).
39 COMMERcE REP. (DMCA), supra note 46, at 25.
35 See, e.g., Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, supra note 25,
at 31 ("[W]e have little choice but to use yesterday's heritage as the launch point to
address tomorrow's needs.").
1 See supra Part I (tracing public policy issues of access and copying from the Rif
in the eleventh century).
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the only users whose interests are truly safeguarded are those fews s2
who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever
technological measures are placed in their path.s3
This defect is not a small one. Many legislators characterized the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act as "probably one of the most impor-
tant bills that we have passed this Congress."s  The fair use issue con-
stitutes "one of the most important provisions of this legislation." 5
Accordingly, it is a source of disappointment to be forced to disagree
with the conclusion that Congress "mastered the intricate details of
this complex subject and has produced a balanced result.
5 56
Nonetheless, harm from that defect is not inexorable. For the
pay-per-use world is not inevitable-for one thing, the technology to
develop it may never come to bear . 5  Even if it did, market factors
might preclude its exploitation. s0 Accordingly, the instant Wrap-Up
cannot tie all the loose ends together. Only the passage of many
years, decades in all probability, can reveal the ultimate contours of
the world that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act will actually gov-
359
em.
3- In addition, the likes of Goliath Corp. arguably find protection for all their em-
ployees, humanists and techies alike. See supra note 327 (illustrating how, presumably,
the actions of employees are imputed to their employer, who is exempted from liabil-
ity).s5
See supra Part III.C.4 (providing hypotheticals showing how § 1201 affects those
with and those without sufficient technological expertise).
35 144 CONG. REc. H10618 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Steams); see
also 144 CONG. REG. S11889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) ("[T]he
DMCA is one of the most important bills passed this session....").
35 144 CONG. REc. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Bliley); see also
144 CONG. REc. E2144 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Tauzin) (asserting
that the fair use exception is "the most important contribution that we made to this
bill").
3% 144 CONG. REC. H7096 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (remarks ofRep. Boucher).
s57 See supra Part III.C.1 (arguing that one possible future, where lending libraries
continue to flourish, may moot concern about fair use in the digital world). The archi-
tecture of the Internet will weigh heavily in this equation. SeeLESSIG, supra note 325, at
30-42.
35 "In fact, there is some indication that copyright owners are nervous about their
ability to impose technological controls to the full extent that theywould like." Cohen,
supra note 232, at 520. Even if the copyright owners tried to impose such schemes,
consumers might resist or reject them. See id. at 523 (providing examples of consum-
ers' ability to affect product offering in high tech markets). Consumers' prospects for
success in that endeavor will rise, to the extent that the Internet of the future embod-
ies open code. See LESSIG, supra note 325, at 100-08.
359 See Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyfight Act, supra note 1, at 465
(indicating that future problems in digital copyright issues cannot now be entirely
known).
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In the event that future technology and business models do in-
deed converge to produce such a pay-per-use world, then the struc-
ture of section 1201, notwithstanding pious protests to the contrary,
cannot meaningfully serve as the tool to defeat universal pay-per-use
and de facto perpetual protection. Instead, courts at that juncture
would be called upon to apply section 1201 to that world of the fu-
ture-whether by upholding it exactly as written, by interpolating..
into it additional exceptions to give substance to the user exemption
that it already containsno or by making the determination that protec-
tion for user rights (traditionally protected in the analog world
through such devices as fair use 62 and the first sale doctrine) rises to
constitutionalss levels.364
In any event, the issues ventilated herein seem unlikely to disap-
*60 Both the first sale doctrine and the fair use defense began as judicial construc-
tions that Congress later codified. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research
Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140 (1998) ("[W]e first endorsed the first sale doctrine in a
case involving a claim by a publisher that the resale of its books at discounted prices
infringed its copyright on the books."); Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Until the 1976 Copyright Act, the doc-
trine of fair use grew exclusively out of the common law."). It remains to be seen
whether courts may apply their common law powers to fashion a type of fair use de-
fense to the anti-circumvention strictures of § 1201, independent of the fair use de-
fense that § 107 codifies as to copyright infringement.
S6 "Courts interpreting section 1201 may either be forced to find liability in some
situations in which it would be inappropriate to impose it or to stretch existing limita-
tions. Congress may eventually need to revise this provision to recognize a broader
range of exceptions." Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Wy the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519,
538 (1999).
6 It is to be noted that the Supreme Court recently had occasion to state that
"[firom the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copy-
righted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts .... '" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
Congress's efforts in parallel domains have not fared well under constitutional
challenges. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down provisions of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. 1997), as
unconstitutional); ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d. 473, 497-98 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (striking
down the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West Supp. 1999), as uncon-
stitutional).
*- See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing practical implications
in assessing whether users rights rise to constitutional levels). It is impossible to ad-
dress, at enactment of the WIPO Treaties Act, what the resolution might be, in a future
world, of a First Amendment challenge to technologies alleged to lock up works of
public interest. For early ruminations on the subject, see Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air
to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 420-29 (1999) (averring that anti-device feature of § 1201 effectively violates
freedom of the press, if not freedom of speech, and should be stricken on that basis).
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pear quickly. They express conflicts latent in works of authorship and
the tug-of-war that they generate between property rights and notions
of access founded on public policy. Previous legal systems confronted
those conflicts even before the advent of copyright protection, as
demonstrated by the Rif and the Rema. Those sages' positions are
carried forward by heirs to each tradition battling before the U.S.
Congress. It should not surprise us to realize that these issues of pub-
lic policy are destined to remain with us into the next millennium as
well.
